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This thesis examines finitism and the Cantorian theory of numbers. It gives an 
overview of relevant mathematical philosophies, in particular the finitistic controversy, 
and then presents Cantor's transfinite theory and the three principles behind his 
transfinite theory, namely the domain principle, the enumeral principle, and the 
abstraction principle. In presenting the principles various objections specific to the 
principles are raised. The major arguments against Cantor's theory—arguments 
relating to the endorsement of free mathematics, the use of non-constructive proof, the 
need to justify his weak reductionism, the existence of non-Cantorian sets, intension 
in an extensional theory, and tension of increasable infinity with absolute infinity, are 
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Introduction and Preliminary 
Discussions 
1.1 Introduction 
In 1925, Hilbert says before a congress of the Westphalian Math-
ematical Society that 
Disputes about the foundations of analysis] have 
not terminated because the meaning of the infinite, as 
that concept is used in mathematics, has never been 
completely clarifiied. [38, p.134 
Despite this the situation has not been much improved since. 
The concept of the infinite is what we will be concerned with in 
this paper. 
The problems we are interested in are simple to state, though 
perhaps not as simple to make clear: what are infinite numbers, 
and should or should not they be allowed? And, on a higher 
level, what do comparisons of infinities mean, and should or 
should these be allowed? Why, and why not? The philosophical 
school prohibiting both is known as finitism. Thus in this paper 
finitism will be one of our foci. 
Historically speaking, finitism had not really been a philo-
sophical school until Cantor published his epoch-making papers, 
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for before that there was no finitism because there was nothing 
as clear and as definite as Cantor's theory to oppose to. For a 
historical account of related developments, the reader is referred 
to Section 3.0.1 of this thesis and to Tiles [67:. 
1.1.1 Overview of the Thesis 
Position 
My position is that Cantor's justification for transfinite numbers 
via his theory of numbers does not stand because of the follow-
ing problems detailed in the thesis, namely the endorsement of 
free mathematics, the use of non-constructive proof, the need 
to justify his weak reductionism, the existence of non-Cantorian 
sets, intension in an extensional theory, and, finally, tension of 
increasable infinity with absolute infinity. 
Contribution 
My thesis addresses the issue of infinity in a way that is seldom 
done. It combines philosophical reflection and technical survey 
of the relevant concepts. It organises and re-explores the now 
relatively dormant side of finitists in the debate of finitism vs. 
Cantor's transfinite theory. 
It presents an original system of analysis for analysing math-
ematical philosophies and casts a clear light on the similarities 
and differences of the major schools of the philosophy of math-
ematics which are seldom precisely articulated in any way in 
discussions in the field. (Chapter 2) 
It brings to clear view the philosophically suspect assump-
tions of his theory in a precise and concise fashion drastically 
improving on the existing formulations (the three principles in 
Chapter 3). 
It critically examines these assumptions and presents refor-
mulated arguments against them (the six problems in Chap-
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ter 4). Of these six objections, free mathematics has not been 
explicitly raised against Cantors theory of transfinite numbers; 
the section about non-constructive proof gives a rigorous philo-
sophical discussion of the technical problem, re-organising the 
myriad of controversy involved; weak reductionism is a problem 
that texts in the literature do not pay due attention to; the 
ontological problem caused by non-Cantorian sets to Cantor's 
transfinite theory has not been looked into at all; Wittgenstein's 
objection about the use of intension in an extensional theory is 
relatively well-known, but the subsidiary section about the in-
finite as a rule in relation to cardinal and ordinal theories is 
original; tension with absolute infinity has not been presented 
as an issue against Cantor's transfinite theory. 
Reformulated arguments are at once critical and original, for 
others have surely used similar ones before, but not in this con-
text. The thesis gives a well-articulated account of the whole 
issue which has not been brought together before and which 
enables the reader to decide his stance in the matter. 
1.1.2 Background 
In Section 1,2, we will first try to discuss and clarify philosophi-
cally some of the key concepts involved in mathematics and the 
philosophy of mathematics. 
And then in Chapter 2，we will present a brief overview of 
various schools of mathematical philosophies before diving into 
the corresponding attitudes towards infinities and transfinite 
numbers. Firstly, in Section 2.1, we will briefly introduce the 
main schools of mathematical philosophy, namely nominalism, 
conceptualism, intuitionism, realism, empiricism, logicism, neo-
logicism, formalism, and practicism. After that we will give an 
examination and explication of mathematical philosophies in the 
context of metaphysics (Section 2.3), semantics (Section 2.4)， 
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epistemology (Section 2.5), foundations of mathematics (Sec-
tion 2.6), and finally finitistic considerations (Sections 2.7 and 
2.8). 
1.1.3 About Chapter 3: Details of the Theory 
In Chapter 3, we will give some historical and theoretical notes 
on Cantor's theory (Sections 3.0.1 and 3.0.2). After that we 
will articulate Cantor's three principles behind his transfinite 
theory, the domain principle, the enumeral principle, and the 
abstraction principle. 
The Domain Principle 
Section 3.1 deals with the domain principle. The domain princi-
ple says that for any variable to be meaningful in a mathemat-
ical context, there has to be a domain for it to range over. Its 
consequence is that any potential infinity presupposes a corre-
sponding actual infinity. In mathematics, if an equation with a 
variable x does not have a domain, the x in the equation would 
be meaningless. Frequently the variable x is said by classical 
finitists to denote a potentially infinite quantity. In the context 
of Cantor's theory, for a variable quantity that is "potentially 
infinite", actual infinity is its domain. The consequence of the 
domain principle that any potential infinity presupposes a cor-
responding actual infinity put advocates of potential infinity in 
a dilemma, for because of this they cannot coherently endorse 
potential infinity, while at the same time shunning actual infin-
ity. 
Section 3.1.2 deals with the problems associated with the 
domain principle. The problems with the domain principle is, 
firstly, the paradoxical nature of an infinite totality, for it is 
reasonable to doubt if any given "whole" could be genuinely 
infinite. 
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The second problem is the primacy of actual infinity. Can-
tor's argument via the domain principle presupposes that it is 
not possible for potential infinity to be meaningful without pre-
supposing actual infinity as its domain. Endorsing the primacy 
or independence of potential infinity at least have the merit of 
being a weaker claim and thus easier to justify. 
The Enumeral Principle 
Section 3.2 deals with the enumeral principle. The enumeral 
principle contends that being a natural number is being the 
enumeral of a well-ordered set. An enumeral e of a well-ordered 
set (E, <) stands in such a relation to it if and only if the set of 
predecessors of e is isomorphic to (E, <). Loosely speaking, the 
enumeral principle says that numbers are the counting numbers 
of ordered objects. We know the magnitude of sets because we 
have ordered their members and we can tell from the structure 
how big it is. We know how big a set is in much the same way 
as the way we know how big a hotel is through checking the 
room number of the last room if its room numbers are given 
consecutively. Cantor thinks that to be a natural number is to 
be an ordinal number, and in turn an ordinal number is the 
enumeral of a well-ordered set. Therefore, he argues, a finite 
number is not inherently different from an infinite number be-
cause each one is respectively the enumeral of a well-ordered set 
which has the same sort of structure and capable of undergoing 
the same set-theoretical operations regardless of whether it is a 
finite well-ordered set or an infinite well-ordered set. 
Section 3.2.5 deals with the problems associated with the enu-
meral principle. The first problem with the enumeral principle 
is that an ordinal number is in its original sense a counting num-
ber. But it is not at all possible that transfinite numbers could 
be counted. Thus the enumeral principle accounting for the nat-
ural numbers via the ordinal numbers does not stand very well 
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conceptually. 
The second problem is that the well-ordering principle which 
is presupposed in the enumeralist account is independent in a 
well-received axiomatic system. If even such an "obvious" prin-
ciple cannot be proved axiomatically in a canonical system, what 
ground does it have other than its obviousness? If the well-
ordering principle were provable in the system, then the enu-
ineral principle could be a well-grounded, well-fitted account of 
the natural numbers. But if it were not, then the enumeral prin-
ciple cannot very well claim precedence over other accounts. If 
the enumeral principle cannot claim precedence over other ac-
counts, then the equal status that it gives to the finite numbers 
and the infinite imiiibers cannot be established convincingly by 
means of it. 
The Abstraction Principle 
Section 3.3 deals with the abstraction principle. The abstraction 
principle says that a number is a cardinal number. A cardinal 
number is a "pure", definite set composed of abstract units to 
which all sets with the same cardinality (number of elements) 
will be equivalent (one-one correspondent). Cantor's argument 
via the abstraction principle goes like this: if numbers are con-
strued as cardinal numbers, then since the comparison and ma-
nipulations of cardinal nmubers is done by means one-one cor-
respondence which is as meaningful and determinate between 
infinite cardinal numbers as between finite cardinal numbers, 
infinite numbers have the same status as finite numbers. 
Section 3.3.5 deals with the problems associated with the ab-
straction principle. The first problem with the abstractionist 
account is that these abstract "ones", these abstract units, are 
rather problematic. How can we distinguish among the abstract 
ones and use them to count if they are really abstract and pre-
sumable indistinguishable, without presupposing some numeric 
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concept? Notice that no technique bypassing some sort of nu-
meric concept has been employed in Cantor's account, and by 
the extensionality principle, anything that is indistinguishable 
with something is identical with that thing. 
The second problem with the abstractionist account is that 
in Cantor's formulation the cardinal number M of a set M is 
actually a set in one-one correspondence with M and that it is 
ontologically more cumbersome than the Frege-Russell logicist 
formulation. 
1.1.4 About Chapter 4: Defects of the Theory 
After a brief discussion of problems associated with each princi-
ple, we will give more detailed arguments against Cantor's the-
ory in Chapter 4. These include the endorsement of free mathe-
matics, the use of non-constructive proof, the need to justify his 
weak reductionism, the existence of non-Cantorian sets, inten-
sion in an extensional theory, and, finally, tension of increasable 
infinity with absolute infinity. 
Section 4.1 discusses Cantor's endorsement of free mathemat-
ics and the use of non-constructive proof. This part's focus is 
on Cantor's generosity with existence and proof. 
Structure and Procedure: Free Mathematics 
Section 4.1.1 deals with Cantor's endorsement of free mathemat-
ics. Free mathematics is the doctrine that endorses a maximum 
ontology, allowing existence whenever no inconsistencies result. 
Cantor's theory seems to be based on a preference for free math-
ematics. Advocates of free mathematics argue that mathemat-
ical objects are free creations of the mind, which is the only 
constraint, apart from the law of contradiction, to what can be 
said to exist. Whether this generosity with ontology is appro-
priate is a difficult question. The advantage of this position is 
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that there is more creative space for the mathematician to work 
with, while the disadvantage of it is that mathematics under 
this doctrine has less security, and it gives rise to more diffi-
cult foundational questions. The lack of existence proofs and 
the violation of the simplicity principle also pose problems for 
Cantor. 
Structure and Procedure: Non-constructive Proof 
Section 4.1.2 deals with the use of non-constructive proof in 
Cantor's theory. A constructive proof is a proof in which the 
existence of a mathematical object or function etc. is not simply 
proved by establishing that its non-existence is contradictory, 
but instead proved by showing that algorithmic construction of 
that object from some accepted primitives is possible in princi-
ple. An algorithm is a specification of a stepwise computation 
which a human being or a machine can, in principle, perform in 
a finite period of time. Cantor's proofs are non-constructive. Of 
course, to be fair, he is not in the minority. Most mathemati-
cians prove non-constructively. 
The problem of non-constructive proof has its source in the 
conflict between the realist tendencies of the classical mathe-
matician on the one side and the requirement of an executable 
algorithm on the part of the intuitionist on the other. This 
in turn comes from the difference in their aims and ontologi-
cal views. Classical mathematicians go by the law of the ex-
cluded middle, and intuitionist constructivists say that the ac-
ceptance of the law of the excluded middle is too metaphysical. 
The classical mathematician points out that using the Brouw-
erian counter-example as a criteria for non-constructability en-
tails that whether something is constructive changes with human 
knowledge, because the Brouwerian counter-example depends on 
the present stage of mathematical knowledge, and the intuition-
ist constructivist replies that a mathematical assertion is gener-
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ally about the construction or the constructedness of a certain 
mathematical object so that this change of state is not counter-
intuitive at all. The classical mathematician laments the con-
fusions and sloppiness caused by the renouncement of logical 
laws in order to account for human epistemic states, and the 
intuitionist constructivist replies that even formalists use con-
tentual reasoning instead of exact and mechanical derivations, 
when they are doing metamathematics. The classical mathe-
matician questions the intuitionist constructivist，s sole reliance 
on intuition which sometimes seems only intuitive to themselves, 
and the intuitionist constructivist replies that formal logic itself 
needs ground and it is ultimately our intuition that decides the 
day. The argument goes on into more minor alleys but the gist 
is outlined above. 
Section 4.2 discusses the need to justify Cantor's weak re-
ductionism, the existence of non-Cantorian sets, and the use 
of intension in an extensional theory. It questions the concep-
tual role, the structure, and the specification of sets in Cantor's 
transfinite theory. 
Number and Numerosity: Weak Reductionism 
Section 4.2.1 deals with the fact that Cantor holds a kind of weak 
reductionism. It is weak in that he does not simply reduce num-
bers to sets, but it is reductionistic in that numbers and their 
existence are explained and justified in terms of sets. As we have 
seen, the ordinal account relies on the well-ordered set, and the 
cardinal account cannot do without the doubly abstracted set of 
units. The problems with this weak reductionism are, firstly, the 
problem of whether the reduction is philosophically appropriate 
in terms of ontology, and whether it is pragmatically useful in 
terms of its relationship with the commonly accepted terrain 
of mathematics, and, secondly, the problem of the existence of 
sets. Regarding the reduction there is the problem of definition 
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and construal of numbers, while regarding the existence of sets 
we have to be concerned with the questions as to whether it is 
justifiable to postulate sets and why, or why not. 
Number and Numerosity: Non-Cantorian Sets 
Section 4.2.2 deals with the problem posed by the existence of 
non-Cantorian sets in some systems. A "non-Cantorian set" as 
we use it here refers to a set that is not equivalent to the set of 
its unit subsets. Now it is a fact that systems such as Quine's 
NF [58] admit non-Cantorian sets. This constitutes a problem 
for Cantor's transfinite theory because it depends on the ab-
straction principle by which it is defined that a cardinal number 
M is a "pure", definite set composed of abstract units to which 
all sets with the same cardinality (number of elements) will be 
equivalent (one-one correspondent). Any theory that admits 
non-Cantorian sets endorses a fundamentally different ontology 
from Cantorian set theory and renders powerless the abstraction 
principle which accounts for numbers by means of cardinal num-
bers and which accounts for the comparison and manipulations 
of cardinal numbers by means of one-one correspondence, as the 
non-equivalence of a set and the set of its unit subsets consti-
tutes an insurmountable theoretical difficulty for the abstraction 
principle. 
Number and Numerosity: Intension in an Extensional theory 
Section 4.2.3 deals with the use of intension in Cantor's the-
ory which is inevitably extensional. By definition, the extension 
of an infinite concept cannot be completely listed and, more 
specifically, the objects in an infinite class cannot be completely 
listed. Therefore one has to have recourse to intensional defini-
tions, that is, specifying the property which allows and ensures 
the membership of an element. However, this brings in the prob-
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lem of the equivalence of intensional definitions and extensional 
definitions, for one needs this equivalence in that set theory is 
basically a theory of extensionality, as in general axiomatic set 
theories explicitly contain an axiom of extensionality. Wittgen-
stein explained his objections clearly. 
Conceivability and Comparability: Tension with Absolute Infinity 
Section 4.3 presents the last aspect of arguments against Cantor. 
Its focus is on conceivability and comparability of infinities. 
Section 4.3.1 deals with the tension of increasable infinity 
with absolute infinity. This tension has to do with the dubious 
role of absolute infinity and its clash with the domain principle. 
Cantor argues that natural and real number operations make ex-
istence of transfinite numbers inevitable because of the domain 
principle, and he states on the other hand that the transfinite 
numbers themselves form a universe (but not a domain) of math-
ematical forms which constitute absolute infinity. But then why 
do the transfinite numbers not form a domain likewise, via the 
domain principle? Cantor does not have a way of satisfacto-
rily resolving this tension between the numerability of transfi-
nite numbers and the iinnumberability of absolute infinity, other 
than invoking God as the only one who can understand abso-
lute infinity, and mentioning the undesirable consequence that 
this uniqueness would be destroyed if absolute infinity were a 
domain and could be mathematically determined in the same 
way as transfinite numbers. 
After this synopsis of our arguments it seems also necessary 
to give before the main parts of this thesis some preliminary 
discussions and clarifications of the key concepts involved. 
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1.2 Preliminary Discussions 
We state some of the important concepts that we are going to 
touch on in this thesis. We will give some preliminary discus-
sions and clarifications of those concepts, which are: number, 
mathematical existence and abstract reality, finite vs. infinite, 
actually infinite vs. potentially infinite, and denumerability. 
1.2.1 number 
What's in a number? This is the problem that underlies any 
view about the foundations of mathematics and mathematical 
philosophy. Is it some entity in an abstract and eternal realm? 
Or is it merely a linguistic convenience and adequately reducible 
to other, arguably more fundamental, entities? We will look at 
the issues that are related to this problem and, in particular, 
Cantor's view in Chapter 3. 
1.2.2 mathematical existence and abstract reality 
What is mathematical existence? Numbers are said to exist as 
abstract entities, but what does that mean? Is there really a 
difference between such an existence and no existence at all? 
This would be one of the recurring themes of this paper, as the 
ancient opposition between realists and nominalists translates 
itself into that between abstractist and non-abstractist camps 
(see Section 2.3)，and as constructivists contend that mathe-
matical existence should coincide with constructibility (see Sec-
tion 4.1.2). 
1.2.3 finite/infinite 
An infinite set has been characterised as one which can have 
one-one correspondence with a proper subset of it {Dedekind 
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infinite), or a non-empty set for which there does not exist a 
natural number n such that between the elements of S and the 
elements of the set iV” = {a: | {x E N) A (1 < x < n)} there 
exists a one-one correspondence. 
1.2.4 actually/potentially infinite 
Actual infinity refers to a completely given, existent (abstractly 
or not) infinite collection. Potential infinity refers to something 
like an unending operation. 
With the development of set-theoretical conceptions, it is 
sometimes speculated that those who assert that the actually 
infinite exists mean to say that one can really keep on counting 
physically forever, while those who assert that only the poten-
tially infinite exists mean to say that only one-one correspon-
dence among infinite sets can be talked of, because it is not a 
physical procedure as infinity cannot be realized physically. If 
that is the case, then despite what is popularly believed, it turns 
out that what physically is possible does have a bearing on what 
mathematical operations are allowed, perhaps? 
However, infinite collections themselves are already problem-
atic in the eyes of some finitists, especially strict finitists, see 
Section 2.7.1. 
1.2.5 denumer ability 
If a set has Hq elements, that is, if it is one-one correspondent 
with the set of natural numbers, then we call it denumerahle. 
Alternatively, if a set is of order type cj, that is, if it is of the 
same order type as the set of natural numbers, then we say it is 
denumerahle. 
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1.3 Concluding Remarks 
We have given a preview of the main points of this thesis and 
preliminary discussions of some of the relevant concepts. We 
will now proceed to discuss mathematical philosophies and their 
stance in relation to the problem of infinity. It will serve as a 




The various existing schools of mathematical philosophies form 
a truly chaotic scene at first glance. Moreover, there has not 
been a very thorough and fundamental treatment of the subject 
in an elementary approach. In view of this, we will attempt 
a taxonomical study, or, in other words, a conceptual analy-
sis of the confusing terrain of philosophies of mathematics in 
this chapter. After a preview of various schools of mathemat-
ical philosophies, we will give an examination and explication 
of mathematical philosophies in the context of metaphysics, se-
mantics, epistemology, foundations of mathematics, and finitis-
tic considerations, in order to make clear the background for our 
focus, Cantor's transfinite theory and its problems. 
This is an original system of analysis. It casts a clear light on 
the similarities and differences of the major schools of the phi-
losophy of mathematics which are seldom precisely articulated 
in any way in discussions in the field. 
2.1 Preview 
First of all, we will give a brief preview of the mathematical 
philosophies that will be analysed. 
15 
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2.1.1 Nominalism 
Nominalism in general is the doctrine that abstract concepts, 
general terms, universals and the like have no independent ex-
istence but in names. Nominalism has traditionally been the 
opposing camp of realism, which asserts that abstract concepts, 
general terms, universals and the like have corresponding Pla-
tonic Forms in an abstract realm. Mathematical nominalism 
holds that numbers are not independent entities, and what ap-
parently talks about numbers really talks about other rather 
concrete things, such as mental images, numerals, or some sort 
of physical objects rather than some sort of abstract objects. 
Thus mathematical nominalism is an opposing camp of mathe-
matical realism in the same way nominalism is that of realism. 
2.1.2 Concept ualism 
Conceptualism in general holds that universals exist, but only 
exist in the mind when they are instantiated in individual ob-
jects, and that it has no substance, nor external reality. Histor-
ically it is an intermediate view between the extremes of over-
liberal realism and over-reductionist nominalism. Kantian con-
ceptualism holds that universals have no external reality because 
they are exclusively produced by our a priori mental framework. 
Mathematical conceptualism asserts that numbers are abstract 
entities created by this a priori mental framework for its under-
standing of the world. Therefore mathematical conceptualism 
also, in a certain sense, stands in the middle ground between the 
reductionist tendencies of mathematical nominalism and the al-
lowing spirit of mathematical realism. 
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2.1.3 Intuitionism 
Kronecker [41] was probably the first person befitting the name 
enough to be called an intuitionist, for he was a precursor to 
Brouwer in asserting that natural numbers and their operations 
are intuitively founded, and that real numbers cannot have such 
a foundation. Brouwer's intuitionism [7, 8, 9] maintains that the 
truth of a mathematical statement is equivalent to the mathe-
matician's being able to intuit the statement. It also maintains 
that numbers are creatures of the mind and truths about them 
are known through pure intuition. This school of mathemati-
cal philosophy could be regarded as a branch of conceptualism 
except that it has explicit methodological commitments that 
conceptualism is not known to endorse, e.g. that all definitions 
and proofs should be constructive, which means that a definition 
of a mathematical entity should give a rule which enables one 
to construct it from mathematical elements already known to 
exist. 
Heyting summarises Brouwer's position thus 
The idea that for the description of some kinds 
of objects another logic may be more adequate than 
the customary one has sometimes been discussed. But 
it was Brouwer who first discovered an object which 
actually requires a different form of logic, namely the 
mental mathematical construction [6]. The reason is 
that in mathematics from the very beginning we deal 
with the infinite, whereas ordinary logic is made for 
reasoning about finite collections. [37, p.l 
It has been suggested that Brouwer's position is merely a 
methodological maxim in Ambrose [1, p.610]. Anyway, method-
ological maxim or ontological creed, a distinguishing characteris-
tic of intuitionism lies in its so-called rejection of the (universal 
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applicability of the) law of the excluded middle, for example 
Heyting says that 
Intuitionists] consider an integer to be well defined 
only if a method for calculating it is given. Now this 
line of thought leads to the rejection of the principle 
of excluded middle [...] [37, p.2: 
(Well-trained logicians emphasize their never committing to 
the stance that any sentence can be substituted into the formula 
p V -ip which is tautological in classical prepositional logic. For 
more about intuitionism and the law of the excluded middle, see 
Section 4.1.2.) 
2.1.4 Realism 
Realism in general could be described as the view that state-
ments describe a mind-independent reality. Metaphysical or 
Platonistic realism grants universals and such like Platonic ex-
istence. Its allowance of an immense abstract realm is directly 
opposed to the nominalistic tendency towards accounting for 
the use of universals and names by means of concrete indi-
viduals. Mathematical realism refers to the school of thought 
that takes numbers to be mind-independent entities (the broad 
sense of "mathematical realism"), and frequently, furthermore, 
the school of thought that not just takes numbers to be mind-
independent entities, but also takes them to be Platonic entities 
the truths about which are known through a priori rational in-
sight (the narrow sense of "mathematical realism"). 
Mathematical realism in the narrow sense (in order to avoid 
ambiguity, we will call this Platonistic realism) and mathemat-
ical conceptualism, although both are, so to speak, rational-
ist in episteinological comniitinents, are nevertheless different in 
that their rationalist knowledge comes from different realms一 
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the former from the mind-independent, and the latter from the 
mind-dependent. 
2.1.5 Empiricism 
Empiricism in general is the view that the role of experience, es-
pecially sensory perception, is indispensable in the formation of 
ideas and the verification of truth. It is a branch of mathematical 
realism in the broad sense of the term because it grants mathe-
matical entities such as numbers (and sets?) the same status of 
being as theoretical entities such as quarks and black holes. 
Mathematical empiricism holds that, contrary to popular be-
lief, mathematical "truths" are theoretical hypotheses about the 
natural world, that they are part of the holistic web of knowl-
edge. Contemporary proponents of mathematical empiricism, 
notably Quine and Putnam [56, 57] (Putnam favours the use of 
the term "pure realism"), hold that mathematics owes its justifi-
cation in its indispensability in scientific enquiry. (See Colyvan's 
account [19] for an extended discussion of this school.) 
Although mathematical realism in the narrow sense (Platon-
istic realism) is rationalist in epistemological principles, math-
ematical empiricism is undoubtedly empiricist in epistemologi-
cal principles, since the two schools really have nothing to do 
with each other, as mathematical empiricism is only a branch 
of mathematical realism in the broad sense. Much confusion is 
apt to arise if the distinction between mathematical realism in 
the broad sense and in the narrow sense is not made clear. 
2.1.6 Logicism 
Logicism, exemplified in the monumental work of Whitehead 
and Russell [72], is the view that mathematics can be reduced to 
logic, and that mathematical truths are analytic logical truths. 
Logicism claims that mathematics can be reduced to logic, by 
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which is signified the prepositional calculus, plus the qiiantifica-
tional calculus, plus set-theoretic operations and some axioms 
which assert the existence of, e.g. representative sets (axiom of 
choice). Whether that should be called logic will be a point of 
contention we do not intend to go into yet. 
Historically, the logicist enterprise first started to be seen as a 
viable approach to the foundations of mathematics in the work 
of Prege [27], in which he tried to create a less ambitious ver-
sion of Leibniz's lingua characterica (cf. the historical accounts 
of this in van Heijenoort [70, p.2] and May berry [47, p.214]), a 
precise symbolic language of logic for expressing content (a "con-
cept script", or an "ideography" in Russell's wording in [60]), 
not just a calculus ratiocinator, a formal system only for compu-
tations. The Begriffsschrift was deliberately made distinct from 
the language of arithmetic by using different symbols. It is in 
such a type of symbolic system that Prege intended to provide a 
foundation for arithmetic. Frege went on to formulate the basic 
laws of arithmetic in [28, 29]. But, as we all know, his system, 
which employs the unrestricted comprehension principle (com-
monly referred to as Frege 's fifth axiom) resulting in a so-called 
naive set theory, was inconsistent because it is susceptible to 
Russell's paradox. 
Whitehead and Russell [72] tried to avoid this by means of the 
theory of types, necessitating the addition of a further axiom, 
that of reducibility, adding yet another burden on the problem-
atic nature of the axioms of the system. This is no doubt a 
great drawback of their system, for if the axioms of the system 
itself are problematic, how can it serve to be the foundation for 
mathematics? More on this in Section 2.6.2. 
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2.1.7 Neo-logicism 
Neo-logicism is commonly characterised as the view which as-
serts that mathematics is applied set theory. It purports to 
replace logicism, which has severe difficulty in maintaining that 
what it assumes is logic. (Some argue that it should be third-
order non-modal object theory instead of applied set theory, be-
cause it most closely answers to the goals of the original logicist 
programme. See Linsky and Zalta [43] for a presentation of this 
argument.) Neo-logicists try to draw a larger terrain for logic 
or loosen the criteria for what it is to be "reducible to logic." 
Neo-logicists such as Wright [75] and Hale [33] try to replace 
Frege's fifth axiom with other principles, for example Hume 's 
principle which asserts that the number of Fs is equal to the 
number of Cs if there is a one-one correspondence between the 
Fs and the Gs. 
2.1.8 Formalism 
Probably in order to accommodate competing axioms systems 
such as those in geometry, and to evade attacks from critics 
expressing uneasiness regarding the suspect character of mathe-
matics and its lack of universally accepted foundations, Hilbert's 
formalism maintains that mathematics can be regarded as but a 
meaningless game with marks, and that formal consistency is all 
that needed for its playability. He tried to prove the consistency 
of arithmetic within a fiiiitary formal system (see Section 2.7), 
but we would use "formalism" loosely to refer to the use and en-
dorsement of formalisation for providing a foundation for math-
ematics and securing it against paradoxes and inconsistencies. 
In fact, formalists can "hedge their bets", for "the formal de-
velopment of ZFC，，i—and other systems really—"makes sense 
^ Zermelo-Pi-aenkel set theory with axiom of choice; see Tiles [67, pp.121-134] for a brief 
account of the system. 
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from a strictly finitistic point of view: the axioms of ZFC do not 
say anything, but are merely certain finite sequences of symbols. 
The assertion ZFC 卜 means that there is a certain kind of fi-
nite sequence of finite sequences of symbols—namely, a formal 
proof of Even though ZFC contains infinitely many axioms, 
notions like ZFC 卜（I) will make sense, since one can recognize 
when a particular sentence is an axiom of ZFC". [42, p.7] So 
that formalists can do mathematics as uninhibitedly as a math-
ematical realist, "but if challenged about the validity of handling 
infinite objects, he can reply that all he is really doing is juggling 
finite sequences of symbols". [42, p.7] We will call this premed-
itated reply to projected challenge finitary formalism and treat 
it in Section 2.7, while using formalism in the sense of maintain-
ing that mathematics can be regarded as merely a meaningless 
game with marks, with the ontological implications of mathe-
matics being merely a meaningless game with marks which can 
only be finite in number not asserted. 
In fact, the professed ontological commitment of formalists 
is null while they do the same mathematics as mathematical 
realists, but that is because formalists treat mathematics as void 
of meaning. But this void of meaning is set down in marks, if 
not physical then realisable if required, so that the metatheory 
that talks about these marks is in effect finitistic. 
Formalism was, together with intuitionism and logicism, one 
of the three main schools of philosophy of mathematics in the 
twentieth century. However, since Godel shown in his second 
incompleteness theorem [32] that the consistency of a system 
of arithmetic cannot be proved within itself, formalism has lost 
much of it charm, for if one has to rely on another system to 
prove its consistency, then one might as well give up insisting 
on its purely formal character, as surely one cannot accept the 
meta-system merely on formal ground. This is because, as the 
meta-system is of a higher level, surely again its consistency can-
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not be proved within itself, so that there is the danger of infinite 
regress unless one accepts the system on some other ground or 
one does not bother about consistency at all. But consistency 
is very important in a system, for in inconsistent systems any 
well-formed formula could be proved, rendering proof creditless 
and the system creditless. Therefore one has to accept the meta-
system on some other ground. 
2.1.9 Practicism 
Practicism, the word we coined for an easy reference of the 
school of thought that regards mathematics as a group of truths 
about counting procedures, is a view that emerges after the so-
called demise of formalism. One can eat, however: one seems to 
be able to regard mathematics as a group of truths about count-
ing procedures only until transcendental numbers, as transcen-
dental numbers can never be said to be actually used in count-
ing or measurement because even if one can keep counting and 
never stop, allowing for a potential infinity of natural numbers, 
it seems that one cannot measure the infinitesimal as there are 
inevitably marginal errors. 
Now we are going to start our analysis. 
2.2 Central Problem of Philosophy of Math-
ematics 
The central problem of philosophy of mathematics is the nature 
of a n u m b e r . 2 But the nature of a number can be probed from 
various depths and from various angles. The nature of a number 
per se is the metaphysical problem of number in the philosophy 
of mathematics; the meaning and reference of the numerals and 
20f course there are philosophical problems surrounding geometry and other branches 
of mathematics, but this is at least traditionally the central one. Anyway this is the one 
that concerns us here. 
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the meaning of mathematical statements is the semantical prob-
lem of number in the philosophy of mathematics; the possibility 
of knowledge about numbers and of the truth of mathemati-
cal statements is the epistemological problem of number in the 
philosophy of mathematics; the need or futility of a systematic 
theory of numbers is the foundational problem of mathematics; 
a consideration of all the above-mentioned sides of the problem 
of imiriber results in a view concerning the fiiiitistic problem of 
mathematics. 
Therefore the following is an analysis of views regarding the 
nature of numbers and mathematical statements in terms of 
metaphysics, semantics, epistemology, foundations of mathe-
matics, and finitistic considerations in that order, and they are 
philosophically speaking the most interesting and relevant issues 
for our purpose. 
2.3 Metaphysics 
The ontological problem in the philosophy of mathematics is 
whether numbers as such exist (in various senses of the word), 
and, if they do, in what form. 
2.3.1 Abstractism 
The abstractist view of numbers takes numbers to be genuine 
abstract entities, not to be identified with any spatio-temporal 
objects or to be taken as shorthand for counting procedures or 
similar operations. (We made up the term abstractism because 
neither the term "Platonism" nor the term "realism" seems to 
be adequate for our purpose here, for both imply some definite 
views about the sort of existence the mathematical objects lead.) 
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2.3.2 Abstractist Schools 
Kantian conceptualism asserts that numbers are abstract entites 
created by the mind, and owes their existence to postulation. 
They are mind-dependent, but still objective. Therefore its view 
of numbers should be abstractist. 
Similarly, for Brouwer's intuitionism, numbers are creatures 
of the mind—to exist is to be constructed by the mathematician, 
according to Brouwer's student Heyting [37, p.2]. Mathematical 
objects are constructed, but do exist nevertheless. 
Those philosophers who hold Platonistic realism uncondi-
tionally take numbers to be mind-independent abstract objects, 
Forms. It might be said to be the most abstractist of all. 
Logicism, a kind of softened Platonistic realism, takes num- .. 
bers to be logical constructs, which are also mind-independent 
abstract objects. 
Neo-logicism adheres to the same ontological commitments 
as logicism. 
Mathematical empiricism regards numbers as some sort of be-
ing which is akin to the theoretical entities postulated in science, 
such as quarks, so that numbers are regarded as real provided 
that the mathematical empiricist also embraces scientific real-
ism, which is frequently the case for otherwise it is pointless to 
account for mathematics in this way as its status would not be 
made less questionable. 
2.3.3 Non-abstractism 
The non-abstractist view of numbers does not take numbers to 
be abstract entities, and rather identifies numbers with mental 
images, ideas, or even physical objects. 
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2.3.4 Non-abstractist Schools 
Nominalism denies that numbers are abstract entities, and, in-
stead, identifies them with mental images, psychological ideas, 
physical objects, the corresponding numerals, etc., and contends 
that numbers exist but in names, i.e. it is merely a way of talking 
about other objects. 
Formalism has no ontological commitment regarding num-
bers, as mathematical systems are only formalized systems with-
out attestation of content in the formalist's view. 
Practicism, the view that mathematics is a body of truths 
regarding counting methods, does not endorse the existence of 
numbers as abstract entities. This touches on the problem of 
what to be a rule is and what to be a number is, more discussion 
of which will appear in Section 4.2.3. 
2.4 Semantics 
The semantical problem in the philosophy of mathematics is 
whether mathematical statements are literally construed, and 
how are they to be interpreted. The problem of construal con-
cerns our understanding of mathematical objects, as well as the 
problem of interpretation our understanding of them in relation 
to the world. 
2.4.1 Literalism 
The literalistic view of mathematics sees mathematical state-
ments as literally construed, i.e. mathematical statements actu-
ally talk about some sort of objects, whatever they might be. 
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2.4.2 Literalistic schools 
Nominalism, Kantian conceptualism, intuitionism, realism, logi-
cism, neo-logicism, and empiricism all hold the literalistic view. 
Nominalism takes numbers as various concrete objects, so 
that even though numbers are not construed as abstract entities, 
they are construed as entities nevertheless. 
Conceptualism and intuitionism take them as mentally con-
structed abstract entities; therefore they also belong to the lit-
eralistic camp. 
Realism regards them as Platonic objects. Thus it is quint-
essentially literalistic. 
Logicism regards them as logical constructs, with an abstract 
existence. Therefore, numbers are literally construed in this 
case. However, as regards interpretation, it brings out the prob-
lem that logical truths are supposed to be true in all models (at 
least the ones with at least one object) in model-theoretic seman-
tics, whereas classical number theory (we are not even talking 
about mathematical analysis) needs a model with Kq objects. 
Neo-logicism also regards numbers as logical constructs which 
exist as abstract entities. 
Empiricists think numbers are much like other theoretical 
entities in science. Hence they are construed literally and inter-
preted as scientific terms are. 
2.4.3 Non-literalism 
The non-literalistic view of mathematics does not regard math-
ematical statements as literally construed. 
2.4.4 Non-literalistic schools 
Formalism, in its most defensive moments, holds that math-
ematics has no meaning and is but a game with marks, and 
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that the axiom systems such as ZF^, NF^, and NBG^ are sim-
ply different games with marks. Indeed this variety troubles the 
formalist least, and is one of the prominent advantages of this 
view. 
Practicism, likewise, does not regard mathematics as literally 
construed because it merely talks about counting procedures in 
a roundabout way. Again the niceties regarding this will be 
treated in Section 4.2.3. 
2.5 Epistemology 
The epistemological problem in the philosophy of mathematics 
is whether we have mathematical knowledge, and if we do, by 
what means. 
2.5.1 Scepticism 
Mathematical scepticism does not see mathematical systems as 
providing knowledge. Obviously, if one accepts the tripartite 
definition of knowledge, there can be but two cases in which 
mathematics fails to be knowledge, the first in which it is mean-
ingless; and the second in which it is meaningful, but unjustified, 
or false. The problem of meaning is in part taken care of in Sec-
tion 2.4, and we will proceed on the basis of it. 
2.5.2 Scepticist Schools 
Nominalism, by identifying numbers with various concrete ob-
jects, forfeits mathematics of a true interpretation, as no con-
crete objects are numerous enough for infinite numbers, and thus 
no theorems assuming their existence can be true. 
^Zermelo-Pi-aenkel set theory with or without axiom of choice depending on context, 
cf. note on ZFC in Section 2.1.8. 
4Quine’s "New Foundations", see his [58]. 
5Von Neumann-Bernays-Gddel set theory, see Godel [31]. 
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Formalism, denying that mathematics has meaning, does not 
hold that it expresses knowledge. It is, at most, to be viewed 
as a guide for manipulating empirical statements, and its formal 
consistency is its highest attainable merit. As mentioned before, 
this accounts best for the competing system of axiomatisations 
in use. A modern version of formalism is the advocation of math-
ematics as a study of axiomatic systems and their consequences, 
providing us with a type of met a-level "knowledge." 
2.5.3 Non-scepticism 
The non-scepticist view of numbers asserts that mathematics is 
indeed a body of knowledge, that it consists of meaningful, true, 
and justified beliefs. 
2.5.4 Non-scepticist Schools 
Conceptualism holds that mathematics contains a priori syn-
thetic truths about abstract entities created by the mind. 
Intuitionism holds that mathematical laws hold true of things 
as the mind intuits them, i.e. they are truths known by pure 
intuition, and that there are no unknowable (in other words, not 
constructively provable) truths in mathematics. In other words, 
intuitionism maintains that we know mathematical truths and 
that all mathematical truths are knowable, that mathematical 
truths and mathematical knowledge are co-extensional. 
Realists think that what we know in mathematics is discov-
ered through a priori rational insight which sees into the realm 
of abstract beings, and therefore axioms and theorems are true 
statements about abstract entities. 
Logicists maintain that mathematical laws are disguised log-
ical truths known through rational insight. 
Neo-logicism holds that mathematics is reducible to an ex-
tended logic or set theory and that we know its truth through 
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rational insight. 
Empiricism argues that mathematics is a section of scientific 
knowledge. 
Practicism asserts that mathematics is a body of truths about 
counting methods. 
All of the above schools are non-scepticist. 
2.6 Foundations of Mathematics 
The foundational problem in mathematics'^  is whether there is 
a foundation for mathematics, and what, if there is any, it is. A 
useful distinction in related discussions is that between intuition 
and ingenuity made by Turing. 
Turing articulated about this distinction between intuition 
and ingenuity in [68, Section 11]. The following is an expansion 
of this idea. Intuitive judgments are the results of frequently 
implicit trains of reasoning. Intuitive judgment of, e.g., whether 
positive integers are uniquely factorisable into primes usually 
needs some other means by which we verify the judgment. In-
genuity, on the other hand, aids the mathematician in finding 
the suitable arrangements of statements, etc. when he wants to 
verify his intuitive judgment. The use of ingenuity consists in 
making a well-arranged collection of statements in which the 
validity of the intuitive steps is beyond reasonable doubt. 
In a formalized system, the role of intuition is confined to the 
stated formal rules abiding by which the inferences made will 
always be agreed to be intuitively valid. (However, as consis-
tent systems complicated enough to express arithmetic are not 
complete, it might be necessary to introduce new axioms from 
®The key terms "foundation", "foundations", "foundational" in its various combina-
tions with the word "mathematics" differ slightly in meaning but the author strived to be 
clear about what is being meant in the context when such combinations are used. Never-
theless due to variations and confusions in the field it, is impossible to give a fruitful and 
precise definition of those combinations. 
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time to time, and this is an exercise that necessarily employ the 
faculty of intuition, so that it cannot be simply dispensed with 
once the formal rules have been laid.) In a formalized system, 
the role of ingenuity, on the other hand, consists in deciding, 
among a variety of legitimate steps, which ones are more effi-
cient for proving the would-be theorem. 
A liberal allowance of a vast number of stated axioms and 
rules can be view as a characteristic of advocates of intuition, 
by means of which those axioms and rules are accepted and 
justified. This promotes efficiency of proof. 
In contrast, a puritan urge to derive all the desired theorems 
in a system with the smallest number of axioms, however diffi-
cult and cumbersome proofs would be, can be seen as a trait of 
stereotypical supporters of ingenuity. And this promotes econ-
omy of the system. 
In reality, however, this is but a dramatic presentation of this 
pair of concepts, and the reader must not be misled into thinking 
that we are trying to say that these could only be the opposing 
sides taken by participants in a controversy. In the contrary, 
these two frequently appear as rivalling tendencies in one and 
the same person. 
When one reflects on the respective foundational views of 
intuitionists and formalists one will see that they agree in the 
role of ingenuity, but the former affirms the role of intuition 
while the latter thinks that its role is, or should be completely 
replaced by formal rules. 
2.6.1 Foundationalism 
Mathematical foundationalism is the view that there is some-
thing that serves as a foundation for mathematics. However, 
foundationalist schools differ widely in their views regarding the 
nature of the foundations of mathematics. 
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2.6.2 Foundationalist Schools 
Nominalism contends that mental images, numerals and such 
like are what mathematics is talking about, and they are to be 
the things that numbers are to be interpreted as. These can be 
said to serve as the foundation of mathematics. 
Conceptualism and intuitionism assert that the foundation 
of mathematics lies in intuition, by which means mathematical 
truths are known and justified. 
Realism sets the foundation of mathematics in the Platonic 
realm in which mathematical entities dwell, and axioms are true 
because they describe the things in it. 
Logicism reduces mathematics to logic, by which is signi-
fied the prepositional calculus, the quantificational calculus, set-
theoretic operations, and some axioms of existence. As hinted 
before (Section 2.1.6), despite its attractive appearance, propo-
nents of logicism have severe difficulty convincing others that 
the system they use is unquestionable, that it can be properly 
called a system of logic, and that mathematical truths can be 
called logical truths. 
Neo-logicism places the foundation of mathematics on set the-
ory or third-order logic. The former seems well-attested by the 
practice of mathematicians, though they do not try to derive 
most of their work in set theory. 
Empiricism lays the foundation of mathematics in its share 
in the tremendous power of science to which it is claimed to be 
indispensable. Hartry Field, however, constructed an axiomati-
sation of Newtonian mechanics without the use of numbers. (To 
examine this feat see his book, [24].) 
Practicism holds that mathematics embodies what we know 
about counting procedures, and its foundation lies in its being a 
correct description of these procedures, providing a foundation 
for non-transcendental numbers. 
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2.6.3 Non-foundationalism 
Mathematical non-foundationalism is the view that no external 
foundation needs to be laid for mathematics, that mathematics 
should be done "as is". 
2.6.4 Non-foundationalist schools 
Formalism seems to be the only school that demands no exter-
nal foundation for mathematics. It affirms the merely formal 
character and the self-sufficiency of mathematics, and sought 
to prove its consistency within itself, which enterprise has later 
been shown unaccomplishable by Godel's second incompleteness 
theorem. [32] But of course with its having proved that it is im-
possible to establish a proof of the consistency of a mathematical 
system within itself, formalism seems obliged to look for some-
thing external to a system. 
We now proceed to the finitistic problem of mathematics, the 
position regarding which is often the result of a consideration of 
all the above-mentioned sides of the problem of number. 
2.7 Finitistic Considerations 
The finitistic problem of mathematics is whether potential in-
finity and actual infinity should be allowed. In Chapters 3 and 
4 we will discuss Cantor's theory of transfinite numbers and the 
principles behind and specific objections to his theory, but here 
and in the next section we merely give a brief presentation of 
the positions of major philosophical schools on infinity and the 
diagonal proof respectively in order to provide some context to 
our later discussions. 
As one can guess from the name, finitism refers to the doc-
trine that reference to infinite collections is to be eschewed be-
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cause their meaning is uncertain and their formation problem-
atic. 
Finitary Formalism 
In Hubert's finitism (his finitary foundation for formalised arith-
metic), for example, this escliewal of infinite collections comes 
with the epistemically motivated desire to replace all abstract 
concepts with concrete, visualisable notation/ When abstract 
concepts are abandoned and replaced with concrete, visualisable 
notation, no implicit inconsistency could arise, as it is simply a 
game with marks, and inconsistent rules in a game are relatively 
easy to spot. One might find Hilbert's finitism similar to con-
crete nominalism, the particular brand of nominalism equating 
talk of numbers with talk of numerals (cf. Section 2.1.1). But the 
similarity is only on the surface, for finitary formalism admits 
ontological interpretations. Hilbert's idea was that a metamath-
einatics with its subject matter, the mathematics confined to 
the realm of the visualizable would be secure against paradoxes, 
while conventional theory about proofs would be at best pre-
carious. Hilbert thinks that conventional theory about proofs 
would be at best precarious because it does not confine the 
proper objects of the theory to concrete symbols alone, so that it 
would be harder to spot any paradoxes in the theory. Skolem's 
primitive recursive arithmetic [61] and Yessenin-Volpin's ultra-
iiituitioiiisin [77] are two examples of twentieth-century finitistic 
schools besides Hilbert's finitism. 
The most liberal formulation of these finitisms would be that 
only natural numbers or items encodable as natural numbers 
are said to be well-defined. (More strict formulations do not 
even allow that.) Advocating whichever variety of the formula-
tions, these finitists do not conceive numbers as constituting an 
^The discussion in this section highlights distinctions which are frequently confused in 
the literature, especially introductory texts. 
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infinite totality but as, for example, individually realisable phys-
ical signs, or tally marks (i.e., "1", “11”，"111" etc.). Hilbert 
says that in finitary formalism natural rminbers are construed 
as strings of tally marks. He wrote that 
The subject matter of mathematics is, in accor-
dance with this theory, the concrete symbols them-
selves whose structure is immediately clear and recog-
nizable. [38, p. 142: 
Hilbert envisages this as the foundations for a complete arith-
metic. When this is supplemented with ideal statements (see be-
low) he would be able to formulate all of arithmetic and avoid 
very complicated logical laws. If there were no ideal state-
ments, complicated logical laws would have resulted from the 
requirement that existential statements have to be analysable 
into finitary disjunctions and universal statements into finitary 
conjunctions, as this requirement renders unbounded existen-
tial statements and unbounded universal statements inadmis-
sible. Ideal statements are statements making assertions of a 
wide scope such that their content is not reducible to finitary 
conjunctions. With the help of ideal statements one can reintro-
duce unbounded statements, for example the denials of general 
statements such as 
-n\/x{x + 1 = 1 + 0：) 
(it is not the case that for all x, a: + 1 equals 1 4- x), and un-
bounded existential statements such as (with "Pr2me(x)" mean-
ing “X is a prime number") 
3x{Prime{x)八 a;〉p) 
(there exists some x such that x is prime and x is larger than 
p) which is derived from 
3x{Prime{x) Ax > p Ax < p\) 
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(there exists some x such that x is prime and x is larger than p 
and X is smaller than p!). 
“~>V:r(‘T + l = 1+x)" is ideal because the search for a counter-
example to the universal statement "Va:(a; + 1 = 1 + x)" that 
gets negated is not bounded. That is to say, a counter-example 
to \fx{x + 1 = 1 + x), a counter-example a such that 
，(a + 1 = l + a), 
if there is one, can occur anywhere in the vast ocean of numbers. 
By a different "mechanism", “3x[Prime(:L) Ax > p)" is also 
ideal because the search for a specimen confirming the claim, 
some b such that 
Prime(h) A 6 > p, 
is again not bounded. Both types of ideal statement serve the 
function of preserving classical logic as the logic of arithmeti-
cal thinking. Ideal statements such as + 1 = 1 + x)" 
maintain the law of the excluded middle for unnegated universal 
statements because otherwise the negations of those unnegated 
universal statements, which are unbounded statements, could 
not be made in a finitary formalistic framework; ideal statements 
such as“3z(Prime(X) Ax > p)" preserve the classically valid in-
ference scheme of simplification in a quantificational context— 
the scheme of deducing from 八 ipx)”. 
Finitism and the Philosophy of Mind 
One of the most intriguing problems in philosophy has to do with 
the limits of the mind.8 Related problems have been and con-
tinue to be probed by means of different approaches. In recent 
®The following passages until Section 2.7.1 are of interest for it has implications that are 
to a certain extent significant in relation to the finitistic problem. The following passages 
put forward concepts that are crucial to an inspection to the limits of rational knowledge 
and this inspection is in a sense prior to a proper treatment of Section 2.5 and the problem 
of conceptualist stance in Section 2.7.2. Thus it is tangentially related to our main focus, 
finitism and Cantorian's theory of numbers. However those implications would have to bo 
left for another essay. 
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years, in particular, there is the debate about the significance 
of Godel's theorems in philosophy of mind between, on the one 
side, J. R. Lucas [44，45] and R. Penrose [53, 54, 52] trying to 
establish definitive consequences of those theorems and, on the 
other, E. R. Nagel and J. R. Newman [50, 51] being sceptical of 
those consequences. 
Finitistic thoughts in philosophy of mathematics are highly 
relevant to philosophical investigations into the limits of the 
mind. This is because rational thinking and rational choice 
involve computation. And unless it is mostly made up of to-
tally non-formalisable and non-articulatable "insight", it falls 
under the governance of metamathematical theorems to the ex-
tent that it can be formulated as computation, distributed or 
otherwise. This is due to the fact that if a subject is precise 
enough, then it would be readily subsumable under discussions 
in mathematical logic and computational theories, and to the 
fact that if something is subsumable under discussions in math-
ematical logic and computational theories, then all the theorems 
about the type of systems that it belongs to would be applicable 
to it. For example, game theory is a branch of mathematics, and 
therefore many metamathematical results are applicable to it. 
The modern development of metamathematics has much to 
do with tackling the epistemological problems of mathematics 
and thus surveying our power to know the truths of mathematics 
genuinely. 
Finite Constructibility 
We could start our discussion with finite constructibility. It is 
common to require that a proof in logic to consist of a finite 
number of steps, but it is not common to require that an object 
be constructible in a finite number of steps. By so requiring, 
finitism or constructivism (in one of the uses of these words) 
gives a stricter-than-normal criterion for mathematical objects 
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and operations to be accepted as meaningful. 
However, this restriction arguably represents a more realis-
tic estimation of the power of the mind, because finitely con-
structible objects are something that the mind can surely grasp, 
while objects that are not finitely constructible seem not so se-
cure in this respect. Representing a more realistic estimation of 
the power of the mind might not intrinsically be an advantage of 
this school of thought, as whether it is an advantage depends on 
ontology and a whole bunch of other philosophical issues, but it 
is an important point because we want mathematical knowledge 
to be absolutely secure. 
From coristructibility arise considerations of effective meth-
ods, because when one prescribes the construction of a set, it 
might involve giving an effective method for deciding, given any 
object, whether it is an element of the set. 
Effective Method 
Intuitively, an effective method (for solving a problem) is a me-
chanical method that requires no insight and is precisely spec-
ified. This method is logically bound to yield the right answer 
to the problem in a finite number of steps, if followed correctly. 
An example of an effective method is the Euclidean algorithm 
for determining the greatest common divisor of two integers. 
The various formulations of effective method in mathemati-
cal logic give a paradigm for procedural determinability. One 
of these formulations is Church's thesis of identifying recur-
siveness^ and the intuitive notion of effectiveness. One might 
have hoped that these precise formulations also capture all of 
rational thought. Sadly, it has already been proved that there 
9 a recursive lunction can be said to be a definition by means of mathematical induction. 
Roughly speaking it consists of a set of equations such that one of them gives the value 
of the function for the argument 0, and other equations give the value of the function for 
the argument fc + 1 in terms of its value for the argument k. 
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is no effective method for deciding, in general, given any well-
formed formula in a first-order predicate logic (except in first-
order monadic predicate logic), whether it is a theorem of it. 
(Moreover, it has also been proved that it is not possible to 
prove formally every truth in elementary number theory using 
one axiomatisation.) 
The proof that there is no effective method for deciding, given 
any well-formed formula in a first-order theory, whether it is a 
theorem of it shows that the idea of effective method does not 
capture all of the workings of the mind, as humans can look for 
a proof of the formula and find out if it is a theorem. Therefore, 
it shows at the same time that the way the mind thinks provides 
rational knowledge beyond the reach of an effective method. 
What about machine computation, can it capture and theo-
retise once and for all the rational knowledge that the mind is 
able to work out? 
Turing Machines 
The Turing test sets the goal for computational simulation. If 
a programme simulating human conversation is able to "fool" 
people into believing that its responses come from a real, con-
scious being, it means that not only does a Turing machine (or 
equivalent theoretical elucidations/reductions such as A-calculus 
or recursive functions) achieve flawless computation, but it also 
thinks like a conscious being, for all that other minds can judge 
based on its "behaviour". However, a deterministic Turing ma-
chine would not be able to pass the Turing test because it cannot 
satisfactorily simulate human behaviour. 
For effective computability, a computation have to halt in less 
than (jj steps. On the other hand, if one does not limit oneself 
to effective computability, one could explore the possibility of 
allowing the sequence of steps to have the order type of e.g. 
cj + n, which would constitute a first grade of hypercomputation. 
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However, it is important to recognize that removing an ar-
bitrary finite ceiling on the number of steps of computations— 
treating computations as potentially infinite—in the informal 
idea of computation is quite different from allowing transfinite 
orderings of steps—allowing actual infinities of computational 
operations—in formal definitions of computation. Treating com-
putations as potentially infinite in the informal idea of computa-
tion is tantamount to turning a blind eye to the problematic car-
rying out of a potentially infinite number of steps, for it averts, 
successfully or not, this problem by not specifying a particular 
curtailing point, without actually advocating anything about 
potential infinity. Its just a subdued theoretical point that says 
that the computation goes on indefinitely. In contrast, allowing 
actual infinities of computational operations in formal defini-
tions of computation places this problem—a big problem for 
finitists—in the open. 
Anyway, though non-deterministic or accelerating Turing ma-
chinesio are not subject to the same constraints as deterministic 
Turing machines, complexity theorists themselves find the non-
deterministic or accelerating machines too fantastic. 
This means that, as recursive functions and axiomatisations 
of number theory have proved "disappointing", now, due to 
the "mathematical objection", deterministic Turing machines 
cannot simulate satisfactorily the power of the mind, so that 
if machine-state functionalism is construed as the view that 
"thought is computation of a deterministic Turing machine" it 
does not stand. Furthermore, as the mind supervenes on the 
brain and the brain is subject to physical constraints which ac-
celerating Turing machines seem to defy, it is as yet unclear 
whether any type of physically constructible Turing machines 
would pass the Turing test. Non-deterministic ones might be 
a candidate, as one could let it do a fair dice roll, and this 
lOThe reader is referred to [20] for a succinct exposition. 
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genuinely random seed (assuming that the universe is not de-
terministic) would enable it to appear to be able to answer the 
above-mentioned question, with occasional mistakes. To err is 
human, and this cleverly programmed non-deterministic Turing 
machine might be able to err like a human using a random seed 
along the way. But more research is surely needed on this point 
before these issues are cleared up. 
Much of the workings of the mind and rational thought is 
"reducible" to models of computation, though of course it would 
be another problem whether one should take the reductions in 
the way scientific realists take them. (That one should do so is 
the stance of some of the functionalists.) Now for the processes 
that are "reducible" to models of computation,u there are many 
concepts and research in mathematical logic and computational 
theories that could be applied in discussing the issues involved; 
and for those that are not, the reason that they are not has much 
to do with the insight gained from such these subjects too. 
To go back to the finitistic problem, these considerations il-
lustrate the work and controversy about the limits of rational 
knowledge that we do not have the space to go into. But we 
would go on to consider the part of it that concerns Cantor's 
transfinite theory in Chapter 4. 
2.7.1 Finitism 
Finitisin does not allow actual infinity. But there are relevant 
gradations of opinions that maintain this disallowance. A long-
standing distinction of two varieties can be found in this camp. 
11 Whether and why, or why not, that are all that the mind has is again subject to 
controversy but is sadly out of the scope of this paper. 
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Classical Finitism 
Classical finitists are against actual infinity. Actual infinity 
refers to a completely given, existent (abstractly or not) infinite 
collection. It has its first advocate in Aristotle. He only ad-
mits the existence of potential infinity. Potential infinity refers 
to something like an unending operation. For this position he 
argues that actual infinity would be an actualization of some-
thing which is never-ending in nature, and that an actualization 
of something which is never-ending in nature is a contradiction. 
Therefore, he concluded that talk of infinite sets is not coherent, 
and many philosophers and mathematicians have adopted this 
position since. 
Strict Finitism 
Strict finitism denies the use of any infinistic notions or methods 
as legitimate. Wright [76] gives an explication of such a position. 
It is arguably the most secure school in terms of ontology but 
it would be, at least in this stage (for in future mathematicians 
might be able to find very powerful tools in a strict finitist math-
ematics) ,very restrictive in the formulation and development of 
mathematical structures. 
2.7.2 Finitist Schools 
Noininalisiii is strict finitist, if it is indeed true that the universe 
has only a finite number of objects. 12 That it would then belong 
to this category is due to the nominalistic reduction of number 
to various sort of concrete objects. 
i2The sort of nominalism that identifying numbers with mental images (see Sec-
tion 2.1.1) might make it seem that this sort of nominalism should be like conceptualism 
in its stance regarding the finitistic problem, but mental images can be arguably more 
limited ill number than what a. priori insight can know, but this is a fine point that we do 
not need to take a strong position about. 
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Conceptualism is classical finitist, since it allows potential 
infinity but not more, due to the limitation of the power of the 
mind. That the limitation is exactly at that point, not more, 
and not less, is because potential infinity is what traditionally 
has been allowed of the mind in being able to conceptualise. 
This is a contentious point, and something along the lines of the 
considerations at the beginning of this section (see the footnote 
on p.36) could resolve this problem but we do not have the space 
to go into it in this paper. 
Intuitionism is in most cases strict finitist or classical fini-
tist depending on which point on the spectrum of intuitionistic 
schools we are talking about, some allow the totality of natu-
ral numbers, and some do not. Those allowing the totality of 
natural numbers would be classical finitist, and those that do 
not would be strict finitist. What a brand of intuitionism allows 
would be determined by what it envisages as constructible by 
the mind, and "intuitionist" constructivists can be non-finitists. 
More about this in Section 4.1.2. 
Theoretically speaking, empiricism is also strict finitist, if it 
is as science says that the universe has only a finite number of 
objects. 13 In spite of this, non-finitist mathematics might very 
well be used as a matter of convenience in calcultaions, if such 
mathematics is at this stage indispensable, given the pragmatic 
tendency of empiricists. 
Practicism, conceiving of mathematics as a group of counting 
procedures, seems to be strict finitist. We should not be able 
to count an infinite number, for that is what "infinite" means, 
right? 
13Detailed argument for the categorization of mathematical empiricism in this section 
and the next would take up too much space and thus is out of the scope of this paper. As 
this is not a major claim of this thesis we do not insist on it. 
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2.7.3 Non-finitism 
Nori-finitism refers to the stance that actual infinity should be 
allowed. 
2.7.4 Non-finitist Schools 
Realism is definitely non-finitist, as it postulates a whole Pla-
tonic world of an actually infinite number of objects. This is 
what makes realism appealing to classical mathematicians, for 
it does not set a restriction on what they are doing. 
Logicism is non-finitist, as the logicist programme makes no 
pretence of a finitary proof theory. This is because the logicist 
programme only maintains a reduction of mathematics to basic 
logical and set-theoretical concepts. It is the same case with 
neo-logicism. 
Formalism as stating that mathematics is and only is a formal 
system, would be non-finitist, as one has in most cases the axiom 
of infinity, except that finitary proof theory is finitist de facto, 
so that formalist metamathematics is finitist. However, the no-
ontology position of formalists makes its mathematics utterly 
free and non-finitist in terms of what one may do in it while 
withholding attachment of any ontological significance. 
2.8 Finitistic Reconsiderations 
However, one may well ask, do we really know the difference 
between finitism and non-finitisin as fonimlated above and the 
difference between each of its opponents? Indeed, the problem 
of finitism is part of a web of entangled problems. Tait [66], 
for example, distinguishes between the conceptual problem of 
finitism and the historical problem of finitism. The conceptual 
problem of fiiiitisrn is the problem of "making sense of the idea 
of a 'finitist，function or 'finitist' proof of a finitist arithmetic 
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proposition such as \/xy[x + y = y + a;], which seems to refer to 
the infinite totality of numbers", that is, a finitist "redefinition" 
(as opposed to the customary unbounded sense) of such sen-
tences. On the other hand, the historical problem of finitism is 
the problem of what Hilbert (and Bernays) meant by "finitism". 
There is a way to be clearer about this web of entangled 
problems. And that is to think about the issue in terms of what 
those contenders make of precisely formulated operations used 
in mathematics and of the justifications offered. Therefore we 
now refine the concept of finitism to C-finitism.i4 
2.8.1 C-finitism 
C-finitism refers to the camp against Cantor's method of proof. 
He shows that there is one-one correspondence between fractions 
and natural numbers by giving the former a well-ordering. And 
he shows by the diagonal argument that it is impossible to put 
the real numbers into one-one correspondence with the natural 
numbers. (For a brief illustration of his proof, see Chapter 3.) 
2.8.2 C-finitist Schools 
Nominalism does not admit Cantor's method of proof, as a re-
sult of iioiniiialistic identification of numbers with objects such 
as mental images, numerals or other physical object which are 
generally believed to be finitely numerous. (See note on p.42.) It 
cannot even allow count ably infinite sets, let alone uncountably 
infinite ones, so that the set of natural numbers, and, as a matter 
of course, the set of real numbers would not be legitimate. 
Conceptualism allows only potential infinity, but not Can-
tor's liberal use of actual infinities, because they do not seem 
to be knowable through a priori insight nor constructible by 
our mental framework. Therefore, the set of natural numbers is 
14Note that this is still different from what we will consider in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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problematic in conceptualist view, for conceptualism does not 
seem to tolerate a complete, given totality of natural numbers. 
The conceptualist position of C-finitisin is, as mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.7.2, in some sense an unstable position, but we are obliged 
to leave it as it is. 
Intuitionism maintains that constructive methods have to be 
used in proofs, whereas the construction of any of Cantor's tran-
scendental numbers by means of the diagonal procedure requires 
an infinite duration of time. So the diagonal procedure is not 
legitimate in an intuitionist's view, and thus intuitionism is C-
finitist. 
Empiricism would seem to belong to the C-finitist side, be-
cause of the finiteness of the universe as we know it at this stage 
of science. 
Practicism understands mathematics in terms of counting 
procedures, and considering the fact that we cannot count be-
yond the countable (in the technical sense or otherwise), it seems 
to advocate C-finitisin, because Cantor's proof is way above 
what it could allow. 
2.8.3 Non-C-finitism 
Non-C-finitism, the opposing camp of C-finitism, allows Can-
tor's diagonal method of proof. 
2.8.4 Non-C-finitist Schools 
Realism has been liberal from a historical point of view, and 
it seems to favour anything that most mathematicians allow, 
and as Cantor's sets do not contain inconsistencies (his formu-
lation does not entail Russell's paradox as he did not explicitly 
allow unrestricted formation of just about any sets the way later 
theorists assume; he also knew of Burali-Forti paradox, cf. Sec-
tion 4.3.1)’ realists should allow one to work on them. Thus 
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realists endorse Cantor's diagonal procedure and therefore real-
ism belongs to the non-C-finitist camp. 
Logicism allows mathematical operations that can be phrased 
in terms of logical vocabulary and the ontological commitments 
thereof, so it should be comfortable with Cantor's work on trans-
finite numbers. But this is as the logicists intended it and not 
what they actually hold, for in the strict sense logic does not 
contain enough ontological commitments to allow mathematics. 
This is because it is not the case that axiomatic set theory is 
true in every possible world, if we adopt the stipulative use of 
the term "logic" in the fashion Tarski argued for. 
On the other hand, neo-logicists can say that they are truly 
non-C-finitist. As they have made clear, they have all the req-
uisite logical vocabulary and the ontological commitments to 
formulate mathematics, and this is something which logicists 
cannot not vouch for. 
Formalism is also non-C-finitist because formalist mathemat-
ics only requires consistency. But again it should be noted that 
fiiiitary proof theory is fiiiitist de facto, so that formalist meta-
mathematics is finitist, just that the no-ontology position of for-
malists makes its mathematics utterly free and non-finitist while 
withholding any ontological commitment to what it says liter-
ally. 
2.9 Concluding Remarks 
We have given a brief treatment of the finitistic problem in order 
to show it in the context of other branches of philosophy of 
mathematics. We will proceed to give an extended discussion in 
the coming chapters. 
Chapter 3 
Principles of Transfinite Theory 
Before we can discuss finitism, we have to have an in-depth 
understanding of Cantor's theory and justification of transfinite 
numbers. Cantor's transfinite theory is, of course, non-finitist, 
and it is the instance of non-finitism which fueled the rise of 
modern finitism because it made precise discussions possible. 
Cantor's theory of transfinite numbers is mainly based on 
three principles, namely the domain principle, the enumeral 
principle, and the abstraction principle. We will explain each 
of them in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. 
This summary and reformulation of Cantor's transfinite the-
ory in terms of the three principles draw on Hallett [34] but 
improve vastly in terms of organisation. 
The discussions following each principle develop from ideas 
many of which are merely hinted at in discussions in the field. 
However, before introducing the three principles, first we will 
need a brief account of the historical and theoretical background. 
3.0.1 Historical Notes on Infinity 
Prom the time of the Greeks, infinity was known to be a tricky 
concept, and let us have a quick view of its history. And after 
that we will present Cantor's proof. 
More than 2300 years ago, Aristotle argued that distance is 
48 
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not infinitely divisible, and he argued for that view because of 
Zeno's paradoxes, whose moral is that infinite divisibility and 
motion are not compatible. This view dominated the scene, 
through the antiquities and the middle ages, until Newton and 
Leibniz independently developed infinitesimal calculus towards 
the end of the seventeenth century. In 1734, Berkeley criticised 
those methods as "an infinite Difficulty to any Man whatso-
ever" [3，§5] because they operate on infinitely small quantities 
which are inconceivable. Gauss protested against "completed 
infinite magnitude" in a letter written in 1831 concerning non-
Euclidean geometry: 
...][B]ut I protest against the use of infinite mag-
nitude as something completed, which is never per-
missible in mathematics. Infinity is merely a fagon de 
parler[...] [30, p.216]^  
It was when mathematicians were more or less in this frame of 
mind that Cantor published his works in the few decades before 
and after 1900. 
3.0.2 Cantor 's Proof 
Cantor proved that the set of real numbers has a larger cardinal-
ity ("power", or can be informally thought of as "size") than the 
set of natural numbers or the set of rational numbers, the latter 
two having the same cardinality. His proof is outlined below. 
First of all, one can show that there is one-one correspondence 
between fractions and natural numbers. One way to prove this 
is to give the fractions a well-ordering by arranging them in a 
two-dimensional array like this: 
iThe different versions seen in various books are careless, for example, see [40, p.146] 
and [22’ p.71]. 
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M 1 1 1 1 1 、 
I , 2， 3' 4， 5' 6， 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
I , 2, 3' 4' 5, 6, • • • 
3 3 3 3 3 fo -|>| 
丄 — — 1 1, 2， 3， 4 , 5, 6, . . . Vu.丄乂 
4 4 4 4 4 4 
1' 2' 3' 4' 5, 6 ' . . . 
< > 
One obtains a well-ordered sequence of fractions from this by 
by following an oblique arrow tracing through each element in 
the array, {全’ *， f , f’ 羞，^ 臺’誉’ f, ！，碧，誉，…}，and deleting the 
repeating elements such as | and | (because of j, ^ and j 
respectively), finally obtaining f’ f, 臺 , f ’ 羞 ， … } . 
And then after performing this operation one can establish a 
one-one correspondence between this complete and well-ordered 
sequence of fractions and the sequence of natural numbers in 
the ordinary order ({1, 2,3,4, 5,6, 7,8,9,10...}), with 
1 1 1 ^ 2 ^ 3 , 1 , 
I ' 2 ，T ，T ，5 ， 
1 2 3 4 1 
^ ^ 6, - 7, - ^ 8, Y w 9, - 10,... 
Thus the set of natural numbers and the set of rational numbers 
have the same cardinality, Hq. 
On the other hand, it is impossible to put the real numbers 
into one-one correspondence with the natural numbers, however 
you line them up. One of the ways to show this is by arranging 
the real numbers between 0 and 1 (in terms of binary decimal 
expansion) into an array, each real number occupying a row. A 
new number can always be defined by copying along the diagonal 
of the array and then interchanging zeros and ones, so that it is 
different from each one already listed.^  
^The summary of Cantor's proof above in large parts follows the account in [67, pp.109-
110]. 
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In general, given a set M, the cardinal number ^ (M) (two 
lines above a set denotes its cardinal number) of its power set 
屯(M) is (two to the power M involves the notion of the 
covering aggregate, and it could be informally thought of as 
pairing up the elements of the set {0,1} and the elements of the 
set M so that each gets paired up with the other exactly once; 
the cardinality is the same whether it is written W or 2气 so 
customarily one sticks to 2^). This is because for each subset of 
M included as a member in its power set 屯(M) we can decide 
for each member of M whether that member of M is included in 
that subset of M, so that the number of possible combinations is 
2 to the power the number of members of M, 2^, and thus the 
number of su^ets of M or the number of members in the power 
set of M is 2气 In short, the power set of M, ^ (M) , has as its 
cardinal number ^ (M) = because this exhausts the number 
of possible subsets of M, and a power set of M is the set of all 
the possible subsets of M. Cantor argued that this applies to 
infinite sets too, and therefore given that the cardinal number 
of the set of natural numbers N is Kq, the cardinal number of 
the power set of natural numbers 料 i s 2 � 
Cantor [11, §4, pp.287-289] uses the more general concept 
of Belegungsmenge ("covering-aggregate") but it is enough for 
our purpose to consider the special case of the "coverings of 
aggregates" with elements of the aggregate 2 = {0,1}. 
Now we begin to discuss the three principles. 
3.1 The Domain Principle 
Central to the development of the theory of transfinite numbers 
is the domain principle.^ The domain principle behind the the-
3 Coined by Micheal Hallett [34]. 
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ory of transfinite numbers states that, for any variable to be 
meaningful in a mathematical context, there has to be a do-
main for it to range over. A domain in ordinary mathematical 
usage signifies the set of possible objects that can be put into 
the "independent variable" x in an equation. For example, in 
the equation 
y = 2a;, 
if we say that the domain is N the natural numbers, it means that 
only natural numbers can be put into the place of x. The "in-
dependent variable" does not literally "varies"，it merely means 
that as we put different values in place of x, the so-called "de-
pendent variable" y evaluates to correspondingly different val-
ues, i.e. when we put 1 into x, y would be 2, when we put 2 into 
X, y would be 4, when we put 3 into x, y would be 6, etc. 
The domain principle boils down to the claim that, for any 
mathematical term denoting some variable quantity to be mean-
ingful in a mathematical context, there has to be a domain for 
it to range over. Its consequence is that any potential infinity 
presupposes a corresponding actual infinity (summarising Hal-
lett's account in [34, p.7]). The domain principle justifies this 
presupposition in that it "forces" an equation with a variable 
X to have a domain of x. If the equation does not have a do-
main, the X in the equation would be meaningless, an empty 
place in the equation, and the equation itself would be mean-
ingless, too. Applying this in the context of Cantor's theory, 
the variable quantity denoted by x is said by classical finitists 
to be potential infinite in an ordinary unbounded equation such 
as “y — 22；", for otherwise we would not know what "potential" 
means; and any variable in an equation has to have a domain, 
and for a variable quantity that is "potentially infinite", actual 
infinity is its domain. That can be thought of as meaning that 
an actually infinite set serves as the domain. (However, as we 
will see in Section 3.1.2, this argument has its flaws.) 
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The consequence of the domain principle that any potential 
infinity presupposes a corresponding actual infinity put advo-
cates of potential infinity in a dilemma, for with this in view 
they cannot coherently endorse potential infinity, while at the 
same time shunning actual infinity. If this principle stands, clas-
sical finitism (Section 2.7.1) would not be a tenable position. 
All those in its camp would have to leave for the side of strict 
finitism (Section 2.7.1) or that of Cantor's. 
3.1.1 Variables and Domain 
The domain principle is justified by mathematics that involves 
variables ranging over, for example, natural numbers. Those 
variables are construed as potentially infinite by classical fini-
tists. However, if there were not a fixed actually infinite domain 
for those potentially infinite variables to be "potential in", Can-
tor argues, how can the value of potentially infinite variables be 
defined? 
Let us restate his argument in detail. As potential infin-
ity is of fundamental importance in mathematics, especially in 
mathematical analysis, few people deny its use or presupposi-
tion. Potential infinity is so common in the subject, it is "used" 
in nearly all equations. However, it means also that actual in-
finity is presupposed in all those equations. Cantor argues for 
this by means of the reasoning that when we have a variable 
quantity in some mathematical study, it has to have a fixed do-
main. Therefore, as potentially infinite variables are employed 
in mathematics, those variable quantities which are potentially 
infinite require a fixed domain which is actually infinite. There-
fore any potential infinity presupposes a corresponding actual 
infinity.4 
Certainly to this point the argument is not yet conclusive. 
‘This is the gist of Cantor's argument as given in [14，pp.410-411]. 
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There are several ways of attacking this principle and corre-
sponding ways of defense. 
3.1.2 Attack and Defense 
Infinite totality 
First of all, the idea of a completed infinity or an infinite total-
ity is really quite mind-boggling if you think about it seriously. 
Could any given "whole" be genuinely infinite? If it is infi-
nite, then it has no end, and if it has no end, how can it be 
a "whole" ？ Given the paradoxical nature of the term, do we 
really know what we are talking about when we say "an infinite 
whole"? In other words, could the mind really understand this 
term which refers to something at once infinite and whole? 
On the other hand, is the mind powerful enough to know that 
the "actually infinite" is actually infinite? That infinity could 
be a completed whole all given at once, but not, for example, 
a rule for some sort of unending generation, is somehow hard 
to grasp, for the very word "infinity" suggests unboundedness, 
unendingness, uncountability (not necessarily uncountability in 
the technical sense, for even the act of counting the natural 
numbers which form a so-called "countable set" can never be 
fully accomplished) and the like. 
Inspite of all these skeptical thoughts, the idea of an infinite 
domain has been shown to be very fruitful and coherent starting 
from the work of Cantor. He has shown that infinite sets are 
capable of mathematical determination and operations. Union 
and intersection of infinite sets, one-one correspondence between 
infinite sets etc. make perfect sense, and form as significant a 
part of set theory as finite sets. 
However, capability of mathematical operations does not dis-
solve foundational questions. (This meta-level argument does 
not presuppose foundationalism in the sense of Section 2.6.1， 
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though mathematicians in general would probably not feel at 
all troubled about foundational questions, even when these do 
not presuppose foundationalism, when there are operable math-
ematical functions to play with.) One can still wonder about its 
legitimacy; and if it is not legitimate, then those mathematical 
operations, however conceptually varied and fruitful, are prob-
lematic too, though they may be redeemable after appropriate 
modifications.5 
Meaningful Potentiality 
Secondly, why is it not possible for potential infinity to be mean-
ingful without presupposing actual infinity? This really involves 
a whole lot of ontological and metaphysical speculations sur-
rounding the problem of potentiality and infinity. Infinity seems 
by its nature something not actualisable, therefore why should 
actual infinity be conceptually more "fundamental" than poten-
tial infinity? Potential infinity seems to have the advantage of 
being ontologically simpler and thus easier to accept, at least 
for those that are not Platonistic realists, for it might be an 
irrelevant consideration for them (cf. Section 2.1.4). 
A plausible reply to the above argument goes like this. That 
potential infinity presupposes actual infinity is inevitable be-
cause of the very nature of mathematical activity. What does 
that mean? It means that this presupposition is inevitable be-
cause in mathematics variable quantities simply have to have an 
expressly fixed domain that they are based on to be meaningful 
for people dealing with it, and the same reasoning that makes 
one deny the meaningfulness of a function if one does not know 
its assigned domain requires subscription to the position that 
potential infinity presupposes actual infinity. It would be sensi-
ble to suppose that Platonistic realists do not agree to this sort 
5An original point in regard to the controversy. 
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of reasoning invoking knowledge of the assigned domain because 
a function is always meaningful if it is, and the fact that we do 
not know that it is now does not affect its nieaningfulness, for 
it is mind-independent. 
Is this counter-argument convincing? We think not. The rea-
son is that the nature of mathematics is one of the issues under 
scrutiny, and therefore cannot be cited as something accepted. 
More about this in Chapter 4. We will now explain and 
examine the other two principles first. 
3.2 The Enumeral Principle 
Cantor's enumeral principle® contends that being a natural num-
ber is being the enumeral of a well-ordered set. It would be like 
checking the ordinal numbers of the last item in an inventory in 
order to know how many items there are (provided that there 
is only one piece of each type of goods)/ As the inventory only 
lists the goods once, it gives them a particular order, the order of 
being listed in the inventory, and any item in the inventory are 
ordered by the relation of being listed before another item. The 
numbers of the items do not necessarily presuppose numbers as 
used ill mathematics in the customary way, for these are ordinal 
numbers, and conceptually they are definitely not the same as 
natural numbers. Moreover, they do not necessarily have to be 
symbolised by the arabic numerals, any symbols could do. 
For example, given an inventory of clothes, 
1. Blue shirt 
2. Green shirt 
3. Red shirt 
®This principle comes from re-organizing the presentation in Hallett [34]. 
^An original illustration. 
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4. Mauve shirt 
5. Violet shirt 
6. Sepia skirt 
7. Black skirt 
8. Yellow skirt 
9. Pink skirt 
The following relations (but not only the following relations) 
subsist between the items: 
Blue shirt < Green shirt (3.2) 
Green shirt < Red shirt (3.3) 
Red shirt < Sepia skirt (3.4) 
Blue shirt < Pink skirt (3.5) 
Green shirt < Blue shirt (3.6) 
The ordering relation is transitive, which means that, for ex-
ample, if Blue shirt < Green shirt and Green shirt < Red shirt, 
then Blue shirt < Red shirt. 
The relation is irreflexive, which means that，(Green shirt < 
Green shirt) and that the same can be said for any item in the 
inventory. 
One of the "modern" definition of well-ordering says that a 
set is well-ordered if any subset of it has a least element, i.e. 
the element that bears the relation < to all other elements. If 
we inspect the subset {Green shirt, Red shirt, Sepia skirt} of the 
inventory, we can see that it has a least element, and that is 
Green shirt, because Green shirt < Red shirt and Green shirt < 
Sepia skirt. We can satisfy ourselves that a least element can 
be found for any one of the subsets of the inventory. 
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An alternative and perhaps better way to think of the con-
cept well-ordering in terms of concrete lists is a dictionary. A 
dictionary has clear rules for order and it does not need to make 
use of numerals in order words. We could say that dictionary 
entries give a well-ordered set of words, provided that we do 
not count the words with the same spelling but are etymologi-
cally unrelated (like "bank" as in "river bank", and "bank" as 
in "investment bank") more than once. 
3.2.1 Cantor's Ordinal Theory of Numbers 
The enumeral principle states that being a natural number is 
being the enumeral of a well-ordered set. Now let us put in 
the fine details; Cantor thinks that to be a natural number is 
to be an ordinal number, and in turn an ordinal number is the 
eiiuirieral of a well-ordered set. Therefore, he argues, a finite 
number is not inherently different from an infinite number be-
cause each one is respectively the enumeral of a well-ordered set 
which has the same sort of structure and capable of undergoing 
the same set-theoretical operations regardless of whether it is a 
finite well-ordered set or an infinite well-ordered set. (Zennelo 
proved the well-ordering theorem which says that there exists a 
well-ordering of S for any set 5, assuming the axiom of choice.) 
In short, there are well-orderings for finite sets and infinite sets 
alike, and as a result there are enumerals of finite sets and in-
finite sets alike. Therefore, as being a natural iminber (finite 
or infinite) is "reduced to" being the enumeral of a well-ordered 
set, and if finite numbers exist, then transfinite numbers also ex-
ist because they are on an equal footing because the conceptual 
reductions of each are the same. 
The key concepts involved in Cantor's ordinal theory of num-
bers are: an ordinal number, an enumeral of a well-ordered set, 
and a well-ordered set, in reverse order of the degree of being 
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conceptually primitive. Below are explications of each. 
3.2.2 A Well-ordered Set 
A well-ordered set is a set whose every non-empty subset has 
a least element with regard to an irreflexive relation on that 
set. Intuitively, a well-ordered set is a set linearly ordered by a 
transitive relation, and subsets of it do not "go on forever" on the 
side of lesser values in the way the negative integers or an open 
interval of real numbers do. (An open interval is one in which 
the end-points are excluded.) The inventory as mentioned in 
Section 3.2 is an example of a well-ordered set, loosely speaking 
in a pedagogical way. Cantor's own definition of a well-ordered 
set differs slightly in wordings from the one in currcnt usage, 
but is equivalent, as argued in Hallett [34, p.52 . 
3.2.3 An Enumeral 
An enumeral (Anzahl) of a well-ordered set is a "picture" or 
"representational image" of a well-ordered set. It is a "canoni-
cal representative" of a well-ordered set, or of a class of isomor-
phic well-ordered sets, A "canonical representative" of a well-
ordered set or of a class of isomorphic well-ordered sets would 
be a representative inventory of the same length as the example 
in Section 3.2. And such an inventory would be the enumeral of 
the inventory in Section 3.2. 
An enumeral e of a well-ordered set (E, <) stands in such a 
relation to that set if and only if the set of predecessors of e is 
isomorphic to (E, <). (This involves the iterative nature of the 
formation of well-ordered sets. We do not need to go into this 
in detail.) 
^Paraphrasing Cantor's formulation in [15’ pp. 168-169]. 
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3.2.4 An Ordinal Number 
And, at last, an ordinal number is an enumeral of a well-ordered 
set, as explained above. 
With this ends a brief account of the enumeral principle and 
we now discuss the philosophical issues involved. 
3.2.5 Attack and Defense 
Counting Number 
The problem in the enumeral principle, however, is that an or-
dinal number is in its original sense a counting number.9 But 
it is definitely not possible that transfinite numbers could be 
counted. Thus the enumeral principle accounting for the natu-
ral numbers via the ordinal numbers does not stand very well 
conceptually. 
Of course the dialectic does not end there, it is only the begin-
ning, for even though it is not possible to count infinite "num-
bers" ，Cantor initiated the alternative concept of one-one corre-
spondence. One-one correspondence does what counting fails to 
do in an infinite context一one-one correspondence defines equiv-
alence classes of sets of the same powers (or cardinalities), to put 
it in anachronistically modern parlance. But this goes from the 
enumeral principle to the abstraction principle, which will be 
explored in Section 3.3. 
Well-ordering Principle 
However, one can stick to the enumeral principle and defend the 
well-ordering principle instead of switching to the abstraction 
principle and endorsing the feasibility of one-one correspondence 
between sets, finite and infinite. So how does one stick to the 
9This part articulates an objection to the principle that is original. 
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enumeral principle and defend the well-ordering principle?^^ 
One can say in defense of the well-ordering principle that it is 
important for mathematical operations, that as it is equivalent 
to the axiom of choice (see below) which a significant portion 
of mathematics requires, the well-ordering principle should be 
upheld. Upholding the well-ordering principle means that the 
enumeral principle keeps its basis. 
Let us explain the stakes involved. 
There is a joke from Jerry L. Bona (a professor of mathemat-
ics at the University of Illinois) that says, "The axiom of choice 
is obviously true, the well-ordering principle obviously false, and 
who can tell about Zorn's lemma?" 
The axiom of choice states that there is a set (the "choice 
set") with exactly one element from each of an infinite number 
of sets sharing no common members. For example, there is a set 
of socks with one sock from each of an infinite number of pair 
of socks without assuming that there is a criteria by means of 
which one chooses a sock in the case of each pair. The common 
complaint against the axiom of choice is that it is arbitrary and 
counter-intuitive because no criteria whatsoever is needed for 
the formation of the choice set. It gives too much power to the 
mathematician. 
The well-ordering principle states that there is a well-ordering 
function for any set. It means that there is always a way (though 
unspecified) to order a set into a well-ordered set. Again similar 
complaints are frequently voiced against this principle. 
Zorn's lemma states that if every simply ordered subset of 
a partially ordered set has an upper bound, then that partially-
ordered set has at least one maximal element. A simply ordered 
set is a set with a complete ordering and the relation is irreflexive 
and transitive. A partially ordered set is ordered with respect to 
i°The connection between the enumeral principle and the well-ordering principle has 
not, been explicitly noted in the controversy surrounding Cantor's transfinite theory. 
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a reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive relation. (We do not 
need to go into this. One might refer to Mendelson [48，p.198' 
or Wilder [73, p.l32].) 
Despite what the joke says, the axiom of choice, the well-
ordering principle, and Zorn's lemma are actually equivalent.u 
But mathematicians in general find the axiom of choice to be 
intuitive, the well-ordering principle to be counter-intuitive, and 
Zorn's lemma to be too complex for any intuition. Now the 
axiom of choice is consistent with but independent of the system 
ZF，i2 and that means that the well-ordering principle is likewise. 
But axiomatic treatment of arithmetic is incomplete anyway, 
so what is so devastating about the independence of the well-
ordering principle for Cantor's programme? 
The problem with the fact that the well-ordering principle 
is independent is that a Cantor-intuitive principle should be 
independent in a well-received axiomatic system. If even such an 
obvious principle cannot be proved axiomatically in a canonical 
system, what ground does he have other than its obviousness? If 
the well-ordering principle were provable in the system, then the 
enumeral principle could be a well-grounded, well-fitted account 
of the natural numbers. But if it were not, then the enumeral 
principle cannot very well claim precedence over other accounts. 
If the enumeral principle cannot claim precedence over other 
accounts, then the equal status that it gives to the finite numbers 
and the infinite numbers cannot be established convincingly by 
means of it. 
Now it is established that the well-ordering principle cannot 
be proved in ZF, and that means that the enumeral principle 
. cannot very well claim precedence over other accounts and that 
the equal status that it gives to the finite numbers and the infi-
11 In fact one can refer to a book by Rubin and Rubin [59], that is entirely devoted to 
explicating the equivalents of the axiom of choice. 
i^ZF refers Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with or without axiom of choice depending on 
context, cf. note on ZFC in Section 2.1.8. 
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nite numbers cannot very well be justified by this means. Then 
is there any other way to establish its precedence? 
But that is not all, for the axiom of choice is disproved [64 
ill NF,i3 a respected system. 
However, we will leave that part of the controversy for now, 
and will continue to inspect the enterprise in Chapter 4 after we 
have explicated the last of Cantor's three principles. 
3.3 The Abstraction Principle 
An alternative to the enumeral principle would be the abstrac-
tion principle. 14 The enumeral principle accounts for numbers 
by means of ordinal numbers, but the abstraction principle ac-
counts for numbers by means of cardinal numbers. Now, if num-
bers are construed as cardinal numbers, then since the compari-
son and manipulations of cardinal numbers is done by means 
one-one correspondence which is as meaningful and determi-
nate between infinite cardinal numbers as between finite car-
dinal numbers, infinite numbers have the same status as finite 
numbers. 
Imagine you are trying to "count" a deck of playing cards. 
The enumeralist way to count would be to arrange the cards by 
suit and then by number, and then check if there are any missing 
cards by referring to the representative deck (for the operation 
does not require that you know the suits and the numbers by 
heart). The abstractionist way, however, would be to just place 
the two decks in front of you, with back facing up, and pair off 
the deck being counted with the "good" deck, without looking 
at what is printed on the other side at all. If the two decks are 
successfully paired off, then the deck being counted has the right 
i3Quine，s "New Foundations", see his [58]. 
i^This principle comes from re-organizing the presentation in Hallett [34]. 
i^This illustration is original. 
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number of cards. 
3.3.1 Cantor's Cardinal Theory of Numbers 
Cantor sees himself in formulating the cardinal number in an 
abstractionist way as continuing the tradition of Pythagoras and 
Euclid. Euclid writes, "a number is a multitude composed of 
units" and "a unit is that by virtue of which each of the things 
that exist is called one". [35, Vol.2, p.277] The only difference is 
that he replaces Euclid's "multitude" with "set". 
We denote the cardinal number or power of M, the 
result of this two-fold act of abstraction, by M. Since 
each individual element m if we disregard its nature 
becomes a "one", the cardinal number M itself is a 
definite set composed of nothing but ones which exists 
in our mind as the intellectual image or projection of 
the given set M. [11, §1, pp.282-283]^ ® 
The "two-fold act of abstraction" refers to the formation of 
the set M from members m and the formation of the cardinal 
number M from the set M. 
To go back to the cards metaphor, you use indiscriminate 
cards to count the cards in your hand. You pair off the cards in 
your hand with the indiscriminate cards, and you tell how many 
you have by looking at the indiscriminate cards (perhaps you 
arrange them into easily recognisable patterns, but that is not 
important). One asks, why not count the cards in your hands 
directly? Well, you use the indiscriminate cards as tokens. That 
is a device that has been used throughout history, so that even 
as a metaphor it bears a resemblance to how we do things in 
practical life. 
The abstraction principle involves these concepts: a cardinal 
number, one-one correspondence, and "ones". 
^^Modified translation with reference to Cantor [16] and Hallett [34]. 
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3.3.2 An Abstract One 
In Cantor's conception the cardinal number of a set M is a 
definite set consisting of indiscriminate, abstract "ones" "which 
exists in our mind as the intellectual image or projection of the 
given set M” 
To use our metaphor of playing cards, it would be an indis-
criminate card. 
3.3.3 One-one Correspondence 
Two sets M and N are in one-one correspondence if and only 
if there is a one-one function F with domain M and range (or 
co-domain) N. 
In our cards metaphor, this would be the pairing off used in 
the counting process of the cards. 
3.3.4 A Cardinal Number 
A cardinal number M is a "pure", definite set composed of ab-
stract units to which all sets with the same cardinality (number 
of elements) will be equivalent (one-one correspondent). In other 
words, it is a set that, so to say, represents all sets with the same 
number of elements, regardless of what those elements are. 
In our cards metaphor, this would be a quantity of indiscrim-
inate cards used in one particular count. 
3.3.5 Attack and Defense 
An Abstract One 
The first problem in the abstractionist account is that this "ab-
stract one" is rather problematic. Cantor [11, §5, p.289] charac-
terises what we call an "abstract one" thus: 
17Paraphrasing Cantor [11’ §1’ p.283]. 
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A single thing e。’ if we subsume it under the con-
cept of an aggregate Eq = (e。)，corresponds, as cardi-
nal number, to what we call “one” and denote by 1; 
we have — 
1 = (3.7) 
Let us now unite with Eq another thing ei, and name 
the union-aggregate Ei, so that 
五i 五o，ei) 二（eo,ei). (3.8) 
How can we distinguish cq from ei if it is really abstract, with-
out presupposing some numeric concept?i8 Notice that, unlike 
the Frege-Russell account which makes use of the non-identity 
of non-identical th ings ,no technique bypassing some sort of 
numeric concept has been employed in Cantor's account. 
By the extensionality principle, anything that is indistin-
guishable with something is identical with that thing. If one 
accept the extensionality principle, as many do, then he could 
not consistently allow such "abstract ones" in a theory. There-
fore the question whether one could use them to account for 
numbers satisfactorily inevitably arises, for it seems to be more 
justifiable to assume numbers as primitive, since they are at 
least distinguishable. 
On a related note, it is actually possible to formulate ordinals 
in an abstractionist way. In [71, p.347], von Neumann tries to 
"avoid the vague notion 'type' “ by defining ordinals in this 
original objection to Cantor's abstractionist account. 
i9For example, the definition of "2" in Whitehead and Russell [72] is basically as a set 
P for which there exists some x and some y such that both belong to (5 and that x is not 
identical to y, and for which if any u and v and w all belong to /?, then one of u and v 
and w is identical to one of the other two. In symbolic notation: 
: 3xBy(x € ,M ?y e 八 = y))A 
\/u'^v\/w((u 巨(3Nve|3/\we^(3、~•*{Ju^ = v\/u = w\/v二 tu))}. 
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form: "Every ordinal is the set of the ordinals that precede it" 
or symbolically 
入=[0,A). 
It is in a sense an ordinal version of the abstraction principle. 
But luckily it does not succumb to the same problem as the car-
dinal version. So maybe one should adhere to an abstractionist 
ordinal account of number. But the problem with this is that 
it also has to do with the well-ordering principle, so that the 
myriad of problems mentioned in Section 3.2.5 remain. 
Interiority 
The second problem with Cantor's cardinal theory is that it is 
"interior": 
Cantor's mathematical theory of cardinal number 
is as an interior theory with the number-classes as the 
interior representatives of power. [34, p.119 
The word "interior" signifies the fact that in Cantor's formu-
lation the cardinal number M of a set M is actually a set in 
one-one correspondence with M, Why would this "interiority" 
be a problem? — 
If M is a set with cardinal number M, then we can say that 
the cardinal number of M, i.e. M, is M, which is same as the 
cardinal number of M. Aside from the confusion in notation, 
there is the more serious problem that cardinal numbers as for-
mulated by Cantor are superfluous. That they are superfluous 
is because if the cardinal number M of a set M is actually a set 
in one-one correspondence with M, then why should one bother 
with some sort of pure abstract set formulated particularly for 
the purpose of measuring cardinality? Just pick an existing set 
will do. One never needs to use sets of infinite cardinality that 
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needs to be additionally formulated in measuring the cardinality 
of sets of physical objects anyway. 
In contrast, in the Prege-Russell formulation of the cardinal 
number M of a set M as the equivalence class of all sets in 
one-one correspondence with M, the cardinal number of a set 
is not in one-one correspondence with that set. Jourdain [16, 
p.203] argues in favour of the Prege-Russell logicist formulation 
because it is ontologically simpler as it avoids assuming the new 
and undefined entities called "numbers", and because it can be 
deduced that the class defined is not empty, so that the cardinal 
number of M exists in the sense signified in logic. In other words, 
Cantor's original account presupposes more existent objects. 
One could settle with the Frege-Russell account instead, but 
though it solves the interiority problem, it is not immune to the 
other attacks in Chapter 4. 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
What is philosophically significant with learning about these fine 
details in these slightly different versions of the ordinal theory 
and the cardinal theory is to enable one to find out if each theory 
is really an abstractionist account or an enumeralist account. 
This is because the two accounts presuppose different concepts. 
But then comes the still more significant question whether 
at least one of the two accounts, the abstractionist account or 
the enumeralist account, stands. This is significant because it 
determines the success of Cantor's enterprise, provided that the 
domain principle does not fail. This provision is needed because 
if the domain principle fails, then potential infinity alone, which 
would probably sufficiently account for mathematical analysis, 
seems much easier to accept than Cantor's full-fledged transfi-
nite theory. 
We will look at how his accounts of numbers and thus his 
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transfinite theory fare in the next chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Problems in Transfinite Theory 
Now, against this backdrop of explicated mathematical philoso-
phies and Cantor's theory, we can proceed to give our careful 
take on finitism. Finitists protest against Cantor's transfinite 
theory. What are the objections against Cantor's theory? We 
have divided the following problematic features of his theory in 
terms of the conceptual aspect involved, namely, structure and 
procedure (Section 4.1), number and numerosity (Section 4.2), 
and conceivability and comparability (Section 4.3).^  We will 
start with the structural and procedural problems. 
4.1 Structure and Procedure 
Cantor's theory is problematic in view of the implied structure 
and procedure of mathematics as a whole. 
There are two senses of the word "structure" which are rele-
vant here, namely structure qua entities and structure qua pat-
terns. "Structure qua entities" refers to complex entities, while 
"structure qua patterns" refers to the properties or patterns that 
similar entities exemplify. For example, model theorists gener-
ally mean the former when they say "structure". Of course 
sometimes these two senses are not strictly differentiated and 
1 There has not been any work in which the discussion of finitism and Cantor's theory 
of transfinite numbers brings together objections with such a wide spectrum and depth. 
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the same text might allow both sorts of interpretations, never-
theless we can comprehend the slight difference between these 
two sense. 
Anyway, here we are more concerned with the structure qua 
entities among the two. Regarding the structure of mathematics 
in this sense, we are going to argue, in Section 4.1.1, that Can-
tor's proof sides with free mathematics, the ideological tendency 
of allowing any objects as long as they do not cause contradic-
tion. Of course, not just the distinction between structure qua 
entities and structure qua patterns is delicate, even the distinc-
tion between structure and procedure is not so simple, for this 
view affects which procedures are found to be adequate and con-
sequently adopted. 
But that is not all. Loosely speaking, there are also two senses 
of the procedure which are relevant here. The first one is proce-
dure in a formal sense. And the second one is procedure in an 
informal sense. "Procedure in a formal sense" refers to strictly 
formulated transformation of marks on paper, while "procedure 
in an informal sense" refers to any intuitively acceptable steps 
in mathematics or other related disciplines. 
For our purposes in this chapter, we are using "procedure" 
primarily in the latter sense. Concerning the procedure of math-
ematics in this sense, there is the objection that Cantor's proof 
is non-constructive, on which we will elaborate in Section 4.1.2. 
However, just as free mathematics does not only affect the on-
tological structure of mathematics but also the procedure allow-
able, non-constructive proof does not only concern the proce-
dure of mathematics but also the entities constructible and the 
structure formed from the inter-relationships between those en-
tities. Attitude towards the constructive/non-constructive prob-
lem affects which mathematical objects can be fruitfully "inves-
tigated" because it limits the results obtainable. 
Now let us look at the objection of free mathematics. 
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4.1.1 Free Mathematics 
Free mathematics^ is the doctrine that endorses a maximum 
ontology, allowing existence whenever no inconsistencies result.3 
Cantor's theory seems to be based on a preference for free math-
ematics. He says, 
Mathematics is in its development entirely free and 
is only bound in the self-evident respect that its con-
cepts must both be consistent with each other and also 
stand ill exact relationships, ordered by definitions, to 
those concepts which have previously been introduced 
and are already at hand and established. [12, §8 
Dedekind also wrote in his preface to [21] that 
In speaking of arithmetic [...] as merely a part of 
logic I mean to imply that I consider the number-
concept entirely independent of the notions or intu-
itions of space and time, that I consider it an imme-
diate result from the laws of thought. [•••] [N]umbers 
are free creations of the human mind [...] [21, p.31 
Advocates of free mathematics argue that mathematical ob-
jects are free creations of the mind, which is the only constraint, 
apart from the law of contradiction, to what can be said to ex-
ist. Whether this generosity with ontology is appropriate is a 
difficult question. 
The advantage of this position is that there is more creative 
space for the mathematician to work with. He can investigate 
whatever he is able to come up with, given that it is not incon-
sistent. 
2The term appears in Hallett [34], 
31 have not seen anyone explicitly raise this objection against Cantor's theory of trans-
finite numbers. 
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The disadvantage of it is that mathematics under this doc-
trine has less security, and it gives rise to more difficult founda-
tional questions. This is because the entities that he "creates" 
are frequently problematic for the more meticulously or philo-
sophically minded. For example, he might make use of the axiom 
of choice when stipulating an entity. But many mathematicians 
find the axiom of choice suspect, and they might not accept this 
entity. 
However this weighing of advantage and disadvantage goes, 
mathematicians less free in spirit are likely to question the prac-
tice of free mathematics, as it threatens the purity and integrity 
of the subject. More importantly, however, constructivists, hav-
ing the advantageous claim of playing safe on their side, de-
mands righteously the philosophically requisite proof of exis-
tence of mathematical objects (at least a relative proof on the 
basis of more commonly accepted entities) before applying the 
law of the excluded middle to the statements discussing them. 
The requirement of a proof of existence as opposed to the non-
appearance of inconsistencies gives rise to a radically different 
form of mathematics, a restrained and "difficult" form of math-
ematics. 
The lack of an existence proof is philosophically irritating. 
If one considers, for example, the view of Wittgenstein (con-
structive mathematicians also take a similar view to his, cf. Sec-
tion 4.1.2), he does not hesitate to classify such statements as 
Cantor's theorems as nonsensical, and he would not busy him-
self straightaway, like others do, with the truth or falsehood of 
statements involving infinite numbers because of an overriding 
view of the law of the excluded middle. 
Let's imagine someone living an endless life and 
making successive choices of an arbitrary fraction from 
the fractions between 1 and 2, 2 and 3, etc. ad. inf. 
Does that yield us a selection from all those intervals? 
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No, since he does not finish. But can't I say nonethe-
less that all those intervals must turn up, since I can't 
cite any which he wouldn't eventually arrive at? But 
from the fact that given any interval, he will eventu-
ally arrive at it, it doesn't follow that he will eventually 
have arrived at them all. [74, §146, p.167 
Probably anyone would agree that the law of the excluded 
middle applies to all and only the meaningful statements. But 
the problem remains as to which statements are meaningful. 
Const met ivists are stricter with it, while in most cases non-
constructivists are less strict with it. While a specification as to 
what is meaningful in this context that is at once appropriate 
and fits with our intuitive understanding of what is to be mean-
ingful is yet to be found. Given this lack the prudence of those 
against free mathematics is more commendable. 
An objection along a similar vein is that Cantor's proof has 
arguably violated a natural simplicity principle, and that is "do 
not invoke what is not necessary". If the non-finitists argue that 
real numbers as Cantor explicates them are necessary for math-
ematical analysis to retain all of its parts in classical mathemat-
ics, as opposed to the reconstruction of some and demolition of 
others in constructive mathematics——if necessity in this sense is 
meant, then non-finitists have to establish the insufficiency or 
inadequacy of constructive mathematics. 
Of course, this is a problem with a wide scope and the point 
of contention goes back to the ontological and foundational com-
mitments of the participants in the controversy. It depends on 
the weight put on the soundness of foundation vs. the value of 
applications. It would however be a safe claim to make that free 
mathematics seems not to be philosophically an advantageous 
position because of its potential for creating problems for the 
conceptual coherence of the subject. It makes it difficult to give 
a coherent account for its ontology. What this implies is that 
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ontologically speaking, it is unlikely for intuitionists, realists and 
practicists, at least, to be advocates of free mathematics. 
Closely related to the problem of the maximum ontology of 
free mathematics is Cantor's use of non-constructive proofs. 
4.1.2 Non-constructive Proof 
A constructive proof is a proof in which the existence of a mathe-
matical object or function etc. is not simply proved by establish-
ing that its non-existence is contradictory, but instead proved by 
showing that algorithmic construction of that object from some 
accepted primitives is possible in principle. An algorithm is a 
specification of a stepwise computation which a human being or 
a machinc can, in principle, perform in a finite period of time. 
The problem of constructibility is long-standing. Fraenkel et 
al. writes, 
The emphasis laid on the construction of math-
ematical entities and even the identification between 
existence and constructibility in mathematics is by no 
means a novelty. [26, p.221 
This emphasis gives rise to a variety of constructive thoughts 
with various degree of strictness in their specifications. In or-
der of decreasing strength of construal of the word, construc-
tivism [2，4, 5, 23, 69] refers to the doctrine of a) accepting 
solely, b) promoting, or c) preferring, when there is a choice, 
constructive proofs in mathematics. 
Brouwerian Counter-example 
A heuristic way of finding out if a statement admits of a con-
structive proof is to see if it is impossible to construct a Brouwe-
rian counter-example {Cb) to that statement. (See Mandelkern 
46].) For example, suppose we have a binary sequence a, that 
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is, a binary sequence in the constructive sense which means that 
there is a finite routine by which each place in the sequence is 
assigned an element of {0,1}. Keeping this point in mind, con-
sider the following group of statements as an example. 
P(a) : an = 1 for some n, (4.1) 
^P(a) : an = 0 for all n, (4.2) 
P{a) V -nP(a) : Either P(a) or，P(a), (4.3) 
\/a(P(a) V : For all a, either P{a) or -P(a), (4.4) 
1 if for all primes p > n 
p + 2 is not a pr ime. , 、 
Cb ： an = I (4.5) 
0 if for some prime p >n 
p + 2 is a prime. 
V 
"P(a)" means that 1 occurs somewhere in the sequence a, i.e. 
it might look like 
000000000010000000100000 
so that 
ail = 1 and aig 二 1. 
“，P(a)，’ means that an is all 0, i.e. it may be 
00000000000000 
so that 
ai = 0, a2 = 0, as = 0,...，au = 0. 
"P(a) V -iF(a)" means that either "1" occurs somewhere in 
the sequence a, or it does not. 
"Va(P(a) V -iP(a))" means that for any binary sequence a, 
either "1" occurs somewhere in that sequence, or it does not. 
“CV’ means that a^ = 0 if there is some prime p for which 
p + 2 is prime. Now (2229 = 0 because there is some prime, 269, 
for which 269 + 2，i.e. 271 is prime. 
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Now, if 'Va(P(a) V -iP(a))" could be constructively proved 
for all a and thus also a^. as in Cjg, then an algorithm would have 
been given for deciding the twin prime conjecture. This algo-
rithm either provides a construction establishing the twin prime 
conjecture, so that for any n, there is some prime p > n such 
that p + 2 is a prime, and so that "-iP(a)" is true, or produces 
a construction that disproves the twin prime conjecture, to the 
effect that there is some n such that for all primes p > n, p + 2 
is not a prime, and establishes "P(a)". (Remember that a is ex 
hypothesi a binary sequence for which there is a finite routine by 
which each place is assigned an element of {0,1}, which means 
that a construction has to be given.) 
Unless we do have an algorithm that decides the twin prime 
conjecture, Cb would constitute a Brouwerian counter-example 
to "Va(P(a) 
While constructivism is an umbrella term that covers a vari-
ety of positive attitudes toward constructive proofs, intuitionism 
rejects a.^  for any arbitrary n as a well-defined nuiriber specifi-
cally out of certain ontological considerations (cf. Section 2.1.3). 
Cantor's proofs are non-constructive. Of course, to be fair, 
he is not in the minority. Most mathematicians prove non-
constructively. 
The Law of the Excluded Middle vs. Constructed Existence 
To continue to use our example, classical mathematicians may 
argue that "the extent of our knowledge about the existence or 
non-existence of a last pair of twin primes is purely contingent 
and entirely irrelevant in questions of mathematical truth" [37, 
p.2], so that by the law of the excluded middle, either the twin 
''The conjecture that there are infinitely many primes p such that p + 2 is also prime. 
5lf the conjecture were resolved in some future time in which case we might have an 
algorithm that decides the twin prime conjecture, we can simply refer to another open 
problem. 
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prime conjecture stands, then Va-iP(a), or it does not, then 
Va尸(a). And therefore, by first-order predicate logic, we have 
“Va(P(a) V"iP(a))”. 
But the intuitionist constructivist promptly retorts that this 
argument is metaphysical in nature and presupposes that the 
relevant primes already exist outside of the human intellect, 
which is a point open to argument. So the classical mathemati-
cian stands at a more precarious position than the constructivist 
mathematician. 
However, the classical mathematician returns fire and points 
out the undesirable consequence that this means that Cb is a 
"counter-example" while the twin prime conjecture is open but 
ceases to be one at exactly the moment when the conjecture is 
resolved. It ceases to be a Brouwerian counter-example because 
there would be then an algorithm for deciding the twin prime 
conjecture. This change of state is weird to say the least. Even 
more weird is the consequence that ctn for any arbitrary n is not 
a well-defined iiuinber while the twin prime conjecture is open 
but starts to be one at exactly the moment when the conjecture 
is resolved.6 
The intuitionist constructivist docs not find this counter-
intuitive, for him a mathematical assertion is generally about 
the construction or the constructedness of a certain mathemat-
ical object. It "exists" in that it has been constructed. He 
clarifies that the resolution of the twin prime conjecture fur-
nishes a method for constructing a^ for any arbitrary n. an for 
any arbitrary n does not necessarily already exist in some meta-
physical realm before our construction. He emphasises that such 
metaphysical presupposition is unwarranted. 
The classical mathematician laments the confusions and slop-
®This point is from Menger [49], and the presentation here is adapted from Hey ting [37, 
p.2]. The arguments in the following debate is also constructed largely from the points 
found in Hey ting's exposition [37], reformulated and illustrated in light of my explanations 
of constructive proofs above. 
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piness caused by the renouncement of logical laws in order to 
account for human epistemic states. 
Formal Reasoning vs. Contentual Reasoning 
The intuitionist constructivist replies that even formalists use 
contentual reasoning instead of exact and mechanical deriva-
tions, when they are doing metamathematics. {Contentual rea-
soning is the opposite of formal derivations in that it does not 
strip the expressions of their meanings as in the case of for-
mal systems in which expressions are taken to be meaningless, 
merely marks to play games with.) They too "succumb" to 
those "confusions" and "sloppiness", it is just that they do so 
at a higher level. And, while the formalists want to separate the 
metamathematical reasoning from purely formal mathematics 
and "minimise" the former, intuitionist constructivists are not 
interested in this. 
In fact, formalists would gladly investigate the formal charac-
teristics or syntax of constructivist mathematics. But then there 
is the danger of treating it as merely part of mathematics, which 
the more radical constructivists would not be content with. It 
would be reasonable to suppose that the typical intuitionist con-
structivist views their enterprise an altogether different subject 
from classical mathematics. 
This is because, for intuitionist constructivists, the sort of 
formal systems that formalists play with exemplifies a very ani-
biguous type of linguistic expression. It easily gives rise to mis-
understanding and admits of more than one interpretation. This 
objection would seem rather bizarre for nearly anyone other than 
intuitionist constructivists, for formal systems are generally seen 
as the epitome of precision. But it is not as bizarre as it looks, as 
it has been proved that if a first-order theory of arithmetic has 
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its intended model, then it has a non-standard model.7 That 
means a first-order theory of arithmetic doing a good job would 
never be categorical—admitting of only one type of model. On 
the other hand, if formal systems are treated as simple mathe-
matical structures, then fomalisations are, for intuitionist con-
structivists, a powerful mathematical tool, but they can never 
represent fully any domain of mathematics. But of course this 
fact has been made manifest to mathematical philosophers of 
any camp by Godel's incompleteness proofs, which show that 
any consistent number-theoretic formal system can be extended 
consistently in more than one way. 
However, even in the case of treating formal systems as simple 
mathematical structures, for intuitionist constructivists these 
formal systems are simply constructions made after building 
mathematics independently of the formalisation. 
But this reliance on intuition seems not a little suspicious to 
the classical mathematician infused with classical logic, for clas-
sical mathematicians may not be formalist in tendency but it 
would be slightly more possible for the classical mathematician 
to accept the intuitionist-constructivist rejection of laws of clas-
sical logic if constructive mathematics were totally formalised. 
The intuitionist constructivist replies that formal logic itself 
needs ground, and if mathematics were to be formalised on the 
basis of it then, as it involves principles more intricate and less 
direct than those of mathematics itself, mathematics would be 
put on problematic foundations, for the foundation of formal 
logic, if not problematic in itself, is at least doubtful ground for 
mathematics. This is because the intuitionist constructivist is 
of the opinion that a "mathematical construction ought to be so 
immediate to the mind and its result so clear that it needs no 
foundation whatsoever", and that one needs only "a clear scien-
tific conscience" to know whether a reasoning is sound, without 
7See the proofs in Henkin [36], Skolem [62] and Skolem [63]. 
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using any logic.^  
Put in another way, one may say that logic is part of math-
ematics, not its foundation, for so-called logical theorems (such 
theorems as: given p —> g and g —> r, one then has p r) 
are really mathematical theorems of extreme generality. And 
the process by which one derives it does not differ in kind from 
mathematical proofs in general. By suitable juxtaposition one 
shows its obviousness. Therefore logical theorems do not claim 
precedence over other mathematical theorems.—The intuition-
ist constructivist goes on to argue. 
Intuitionist Constructivists as Non-finitist but C-finitists 
The intuitionist constructivist，s emphasis on intuition and im-
mediateness to the mind might make him seem a strict or a 
classical finitist, but it would be wrong to think that he is ei-
ther. He is neither of the two. The intuitionist constructivist 
takes the natural numbers, as a given totality, for granted. His 
justification is a) that such a totality is intuitively clear enough, 
for even children understand what natural numbers are, b) that 
mathematicians know what it means when they use this no-
tion, and c) that it is too demanding to demand more than this 
state of affairs. But the fact that the intuitionist constructivist 
is not inherently a strict or even a classical finitist does not 
deter him from finding faults with non-constructive proofs (cf. 
Section 2.7), and Cantor's proofs about transfinite iiuinbers are 
non-constructive. This shows a point that is in a way obvious 
but easy to miss. The point is that it does not take a strict or 
a classical finitist to be against Cantor's proofs,^ as we can see 
intuitionist constructivists are also against those proofs. 
®This paragraph is quoting and paraphrasing the account in [37，p.6]. 
9An original point of mine. 
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Intuitionist Constructivists' Inconsistency? 
The classical mathematician might attack the intuitionist con-
structivist's unjustified difference in attitude towards the logi-
cal law of the excluded middle and the unrestricted principle 
of mathematical induction, for to most people the former is at 
least as intuitive than the latter, if not more. And yet the in-
tuitionist constructivist rejects the former while upholding the 
latter, without further justification. It seems dogmatic. 
The intuitionist constructivist replies in defense that mathe-
matics is not about the external world, but about mental con-
structions and the process thereof, so that truth value should 
not be construed as mind-independent. Mathematical state-
ments are reports of and about mental constructions, for exam-
ple, “3 + 3 = 8 — 2" should be read as the mathematician reports 
that he has effected the mental constructions "3 + 3" and "8 - 2" 
and found that the result is the same. Others agree because they 
think in much the same way. This sort of agreement is found in 
other subjects and there is no fundaniental difference between 
mathematics and other subjects in this particular point, as op-
posed to traditional accounts of the privileged epistemological 
status of mathematics. 
The intuitionist constructivist goes on to argue that the value 
of mathematics is of the same kind as arts and letters, that it is 
a valuable activity of the mind. Its principal value does not lies 
in its being a conceptual calculus for science, as mathematical 
empiricists assert (cf. Section 2.1.5). Others attack this defense 
of intuitionist constructivism by pointing out that this school, 
despite its emphasis on the value of mathematics as an activity 
worth doing for its own sake, disowns the most precious math-
ematical work.n 
The intuitionist constructivist now tries to justify directly his 
i°This paragragh is paraphrasing the account in [37, p.8]. 
" Fo r an example of this position, see Hilbert [39]. 
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"unjustified difference in attitude towards the logical law of the 
excluded middle and the unrestricted principle of mathematical 
induction". First of all, he emphasises that we have a clear 
notion of natural numbers, which could be explained as follows. 
We conceive of the notion of an entity through abstracting from 
the particular qualities of the object. Then we perceive the 
possibility of an indefinite repetition of entities.^ ^ 
In the second place, he argues that the principle of mathe-
matical induction stands because of the following proof: suppose 
that E(x) is a predicate of natural numbers such that E(l) is 
true, and that E(n) implies for any particular natural 
number n where n' is the successor of n. Now let p be any nat-
ural number. Investigating the numbers built up successively 
from 1 to p we see that the predicate E which holds for 1 will 
be preserved at every step in constructing p. Therefore E{p) 
is true. One knows this by simple examination of the proof, in 
view of "evidence" rather than axioms and deductions.^ ^ 
On the other hand, the logical law of the excluded middle that 
classical mathematicians hold unconditionally is unwarranted if 
we cannot not construct the number we are talking about. 
Constructivistic Commonsense 
Given this and similar explanations of his position, the intuition-
ist constructivist deplores the nonchalance of classical mathe-
maticians in employing and relating unclear concepts. He thinks 
that his own conception is more natural and more disciplined. 
He advocates the "commonsense constructions" that we have 
before the "theoretical constructions"，which he claims is analo-
gous to the conviction that I see a tree versus the conviction that 
light waves reach my eyes and lead me to construct an image of 
i^This paragragh is paraphrasing the account in [37，p.13]. 
^^This paragragh is paraphrasing the account in [37, p.14]. 
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the tree. 14 He does not agree that his conception of mathemat-
ics as a subject is unruly and capricious. On the contrary, it is 
a conception that is untainted by theoretical speculations of a 
particular age, he argues. 
Conclusion 
This labyrinth of considerations might make one wonders what 
is to be the result of all of these. The provisional conclusion 
is that mathematics is a subject claimed by theorists of differ-
ent ontologies and standards, and that the intuitionist construc-
tivist points out rightly the unsatisfactoriness of certain classical 
mathematical methods. The use of non-constructive methods 
in the case of Cantor's proofs is particularly problematic be-
cause their effect is revolutionary, and they redefine what we 
arc to think of infinity, and change the conceptual relationship 
between number theory and mathematical analysis—if not in 
itself, then as mathematicians conceive it. That these proofs is 
non-constructive allows room for the intuitionist constructivist 
argument that maybe what Cantor is doing is a confusion and 
abuse of infinite concepts. 
But is it possible to reformulate his proofs constructively? 
For if it is possible to do so, then constructivists would not be 
able to have qualms about his theorems. Sadly, however, such 
proofs have not been found. The existence of transcendental 
numbers has been constructively proved (Liouville numbers), 
but that they are uncountable has not been proved. If they are 
countable it does not show that the set of real numbers is larger 
than the set of rational numbers, for the union of two countable 
sets is still countable. 
Cantor places the basis and justification of his free mathe-
matics and non-constructive proofs on the reduction of numbers 
^^This point about "commonsense constructions" and "theoretical constructions" is from 
[37’ p. l l] . 
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to sets and the existence of sets. In the following section we will 
be looking at this reduction. 
4.2 Number and Numerosity 
The conceptual distinction between number and numerosity is 
highly relevant to our discussion. "Number" is the intuitive 
"object" of investigation in mathematics, while "numerosity" 
is a general word for quantity redefined as the quality shared 
among sets that can be put into one-one correspondence. Can-
tor's insight is to define number in terms of this newly-defined 
numerosity. This constitutes his cardinal account (Section 3.3). 
An alternative is the ordinal account (Section 3.2), but the gist 
of the two accounts is the same一set-theoretical reduction. 
4.2.1 Weak Reductionism 
As evident from the elucidation of his enumeralist and his ab-
stractionist accounts of number in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, Cantor 
holds a kind of weak reductionism.^^ It is weak in that he does 
not simply reduce numbers to sets, but it is reductionistic in 
that numbers and their existence are explained and justified in 
terms of sets. As we have seen, the ordinal account relies on the 
well-ordered set, and the cardinal account cannot do without 
the doubly abstracted set of units. 
This brings about, firstly, the problem of whether the re-
duction is philosophically appropriate and pragmatically useful, 
and, secondly, the problem of the existence of sets. Regarding 
the reduction there is the problem of definition and construal 
of numbers, while regarding the existence of sets we have to be 
concerned with the questions as to whether it is justifiable to 
postulate sets and why, or why not. 
^^Texts in the literature do not pay due attention to this. 
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Let lis first take a look at Cantor's definition and constriial 
of numbers. The enumeral and the abstraction principles as 
we explicated have tried to shift the problem of the meaning of 
numbers to the meaning of sets. Cantor claims that the car-
dinal numbers afford the most natural and rigorous foundation 
for the finite and transfinite numbers. [11, §5, p.289] It has its 
advantages, but as we shall see in Section 4.2.2, there are sets, 
i.e. non-Cantorian sets, that do not behave as the abstraction 
principle stipulates. This deals a blow to the reduction but for 
which it might have succeeded. 
And now let us look at the existence of sets. The existence of 
sets is the fundamental and most crucial standpoint in Cantor's 
reductionist account of mathematics. It is the bottommost basis 
in his accounts of numbers, so that one has to either accept it or 
reject it, and can appeal no further. However, there seem to be 
plausible options between the primitive existence of numbers or 
that of sets, as one has to take some sort of entities as primitive, 
while which ones are is a contentious issue, involving ontological 
and practical considerations. 
Atomic Theories of Numbers 
Let us think about the primitive existence of numbers. Cohen 
mentions in [17, Chapter 2, §§1-2] a plausible type of theories 
that takes numbers as atoms or individuals, as Urelemente, i.e. 
a types of theories in which numbers are not viewed as sets. 
In that case, the axiom of extensionality has to be dropped or 
limited, as objects that do not contain things at all neverthe-
less have to stay different in this type of theory (otherwise there 
would be only one "number", as all of them are identical), while 
with the unlimited axiom of extensionality anything that con-
tains nothing would all be identical—the one and only empty set 
0 in the theory. Let us explore the pros and cons of an atomic 
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theory of numbers.^ ^ 
The positive side of an atomic theory of numbers is that it is 
arguably more intuitive, in the sense that we learn to use and 
operate on numbers first, and sets later, so that numbers seem 
to be at least epistemologically more basic, if not conceptually. 
But the negative side of an atomic theory of numbers seems 
to be that it is conceptually less simple or elementary because 
we have to have each and every number in the theory, while 
with set-theoretical reductions we add once and for all an axiom 
of infinityi7 that conjures into existence larger sets by itself. 
(By "an axiom of infinity" is not meant the axiom of infinity of 
infinite atoms of number as in Fraenkel [25].) 
Now we are going to explain what non-Cantorian sets are. 
Non-Cantorian sets prove to be the Achilles's heel in Cantor's 
theory. That they exist seriously threatens Cantor's reduction-
ism. 
4.2.2 Non-Cantorian Sets 
Non-Cantorian set theory is any set theory in which the ax-
iom of choice or the continuum hypothesis is false. Thus "non-
Cantorian sets" might mean "sets in any non-Cantorian set the-
ory" .But here we are not concerned with "non-Cantorian sets" 
in this sense. We are concerned with another, though related, 
sense of the phrase. 
A "non-Cantorian set" as we use it here simply refers to a set 
i6Ai.guments not used in the context of Cantor's theory of numbers. 
i7lt functions like the way mathematical induction does. In one representative formu-
lation it specifies that there exists a set x containing the empty set and that if a set y 
belongs to set x then the union of y and {y} also belongs to set x. Therefore this set is 
infinitely large. And so the existence of at least one infinitely large set is guaranteed. The 
axiom of infinity in symbolic notation is 
3a: (0 6 rr A Vy(y e x ^ yU {?/} 6 re). 
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that is not equivalent to the set of its unit subsets}^ 
On the other hand, a Cantorian set is a set that satisfies the 
requirement that it be equivalent to the set of its unit subsets. 
Sets of naive set theory satisfy this requirement because there 
is a one-one correspondence between the set A and the special 
power set 屯i(A)—the set of A's unit subsets—consisting of all 
and only the {a?:}，s. {a^j's are the unit subsets of and that 
one-one correspondence is one in which each member of A would 
correspond to its singleton. Using our example above, the one-
one correspondence would be 
{ a } ^ a , {P} H a n d { 7 } ^ 7 . 
But systems such as Quine's NF [58] admit non-Cantorian 
sets. 19 NF admits non-Cantorian sets because of stratification. 
Stratification refers to the hierarchisation of set-theoretical ob-
jects. In Whitehead and Russell [72] it was known as the theory 
of types. By whatever name the hierarchisation is known, it 
prevents the establishment of the equivalence which is possible 
in Cantorian sets as presented above because equivalence is not 
a relationship that can stand between sets of different "levels". 
It is simply prohibited in hierarchisised theories. 
In view of Cantor's transfinite theory, it is clear that the very 
existence of non-Cantorian sets is an affront to the transfinite 
theory via the abstraction principle by which it is defined that 
a cardinal number M is a "pure"，definite set composed of ab-
stract units to which all sets with the same cardinality (number 
of elements) will be equivalent (one-one correspondent). (See 
Section 3.3.4.) 
^^Intuitively, "unit subsets" of a set A are subsets of A that have exactly one member so 
that each member aj of the set A under consideration "gives rise to" a set {ai} with a^  as 
its sole member, and the set of these unit subsets has as members all and only the {ai}'s 
formed from each and every ai of A. For example, given a set 7} with members a, 
P and 7, its unit subsets would be {q}, {/?} and {7}’ and the set of its unit subsets would 
b e { { a } , { / ? } , { 7 } } . 
19No one seems to be aware that this is a throat, to Cantor's transfinite theory, judging 
from the literature. 
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This should be an affront because any theory that admits 
rioii-Caiitorian sets endorses a fundamentally different ontology 
from Cantorian set theory and renders powerless the abstrac-
tion principle which accounts for numbers by means of cardinal 
numbers and which accounts for the comparison and manipula-
tions of cardinal numbers by means of one-one correspondence, 
as the non-equivalence of a set and the set of its unit subsets 
constitutes an insurmountable theoretical difficulty for the ab-
straction principle. This non-equivalence is fatal to his theory 
of numbers. 
This non-equivalence is fatal because sets in non-Cantorian 
set theories that have the same "number" (allow the provisional 
use of the term here) of eleiiients can be of different level in the 
hierarchy, in which case those sets cannot be equivalent, so that 
cardinality cannot function as an adequate measurement of size. 
In such theories numbers cannot be reduced to sets, and the ab-
straction principle is not applicable. If the abstraction principle 
is not applicable in these theories, then there is one more weighty 
reason to be suspect of the adequacy of set-theoretical reduction 
of numbers. 
Another important objection to Cantor's theory is against the 
inevitable use of intensions in a theory of extensionality. Unlike 
those in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, this objection has much to do 
with Cantor's domain principle (see Section 3.1). 
4.2.3 Intension in an Extensional Theory 
By definition, the extension of an infinite concept cannot be 
completely listed and, more specifically, the objects in an in-
finite class cannot be completely listed. Therefore one has to 
have recourse to intensional definitions, that is, specifying the 
property which allows and ensures the membership of an ele-
ment. However, this brings in the problem of the equivalence of 
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intensional definitions and extensional definitions, for one needs 
this equivalence in that set theory is basically a theory of exten-
sionality, as in general axiomatic set theories explicitly contain 
an axiom of extensionality. 
Wittgenstein is a prominent proponent of this stance of find-
ing fault with "infinite extensions". As a staunch finitist, he 
repeatedly made his finitist arguments. One quote sums up his 
view neatly but, of course, with qualifications: "It's a question 
of the possibility of checking." [74, §174，p.212]^ ° It is this possi-
bility of checking that underlines his arguably cryptical position, 
and his somehow unintuitive remarks. This crypticality and un-
intuitiveness and the reasons behind will be apparent anon. 
He denies that "infinite extensions" are really extensions, for 
“[i]n truth, [...] it's impossible to talk of [the case in which all x 
happen to have a property] at all and the '(x) • • in arithmetic 
cannot be taken extensionally" [74，§174, p.212] because it had 
to be specified by means of some property. Because of this denial 
of the extensionality of any universally quantified statement in 
arithmetic, which is at least very in keeping with his acute alert-
ness towards minute differences in philosophical grammar and 
linguistic usage, he is antagonistic towards the consistency of 
the notion of an infinite set, as such a set presumably has as its 
members the extension given by such a universal statement. As 
a result of this antagonism, he deems it an abuse of language to 
compare the "sizes" of infinite sets, arid, in particular, a flawed 
enterprise to compare the set of all transcendental numbers and 
the set of all algebraic numbers.之丄 To him they seem to be dif-
ferent kinds of sets which cannot be compared with each other 
at all. 
His colour fully delivered objection to set theory is worth quot-
ing： 
20And another similar one is "Every proposition is the signpost for a verification." [74, 
§148, p. 174] ‘ 
21 Wittgenstein articulates this point in [74, §174, p.211]. 
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The theory of aggregates attempts to grasp the in-
finite at a more general level than a theory of rules. It 
says that you can't grasp the actual infinite by means 
of arithmetical symbolism at all and that therefore it 
can only be described and not represented. The de-
scription would encompass it in something like the way 
in which you carry a number of things that you can't 
hold in your hands by packing them in a box. They are 
then invisible but we still know we are carrying them 
(so to speak, indirectly). The theory of aggregates 
buys a pig in a poke. Let the infinite accommodate 
itself in this box as best it can. [74, §170, p.206]^ ^ 
The pig-in-a-poke metaphor signals his indignance of describ-
ing a structure amorphously. He finds it misleading to say the 
least. But we cannot have more than this when we deal with 
an infinite series.^ ^ Wittgenstein is of the opinion that this im-
possibility of representation by means of arithmetical symbolism 
makes the infinite merely a rule, and that there is no such thing 
as an infinite extension. He also gives a reductio ad adsurdum 
of the concept of an infinite totality: 
Let's imagine a man whose life goes back for an 
infinite time and who says to us: Tm just writing 
down the last digit of tt, and it's a 2，. Every day of his 
life he has written down a digit, without ever having 
begun; he has just finished. [74，§145, p.166 
The idea of "counting" the members of an infinite set seems to 
be lurking behind the set-theoretic assertion about two infinite 
sets that they have one-one correspondence.24 By establishing 
22 "Theory of aggregates" is an older term for set theory. 
23Tliis point is found in [74, §147, p. 169]. 
24This paragraph consists of original points. 
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one-one correspondence between them, the set of natural num-
bers and the set of even numbers are found to contain the same 
"number" of elements even though the latter is a proper subset 
of the former. However, regarding the treatment of something 
of such delicate calibre, care must be taken and two points has 
to be noted, 
1. if two infinite sets were said to contain the same "number" 
of elements whenever there is a one-one correspondence be-
tween them, and if the size of any set must be greater than 
that of its proper subset, then this "number" cannot be an 
adequate measure of its size; 
2. this "number" is not something which could ever be reached 
by counting. 
The second point set-theorists would not hesitate to admit. 
As to the first point, before Cantor put forth his theorem, it 
seemed doubtful whether the definition of equinumerosity be-
tween two infinite sets as a one-one correspondence between 
them would be fruitful at all, because it would not be if there 
were not sets of different infinite sizes to compare from,25 for 
what good does it do to compare infinite sets if they were all of 
the same size? But then came Cantor's theorem, and compari-
son began to have (at least a semblance of) sense. 
Despite the attraction and beauty of Cantor's paradise, how-
ever, Wittgenstein is staunchly opposed to the talk of cardinali-
ties of infinite sets, as such "sets" seem to him to be rules rather 
than extensions. For him, what the notation 2…refers to is cer-
tainly not a number, and should not be subjected to operations 
as if it is a number. It is not something we can ever count and 
reach. And he sees the continuum hypothesis as plain nonsense. 
It would be easier to understand his view if we look at what he 
says regarding the nature of a number. 
Historical point mentioned in Potter [55], p. 153. 
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Nature of a Number 
Wittgenstein emphasizes that a number should not be seen as 
something independent of a number system. It always is a part 
of a particular number system, a structure. 
If, in the nature of the case, I cannot write down a 
number independently of a number system, that must 
also be reflected in the general treatment of number. 
A number system is not something inferior一like a 
Russian abacus—that is only of interest to elementary 
schools, while the higher, general discussion can afford 
to disregard it. [74, §171, p.207； 
The sense of treating the cardinal numbers of the set of nat-
ural numbers and the set of real numbers as if they are ordinary 
finite numbers seems highly suspicious to Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein holds the view that mathematics is a human 
construct and what human can construct are only finite num-
bers and infinite rules, but never infinite numbers. Because of 
his finite constructivism, he deems it nonsense to say that the 
maximum of a function is the largest value among all its values 
unless there are but finitely many, discrete points on the curve 
of the function.26 
Wittgenstein attempts to show the nonsensical nature of tak-
ing "infinite numbers" as an extensional term by examples of 
ordinary usage and analysis of the concept of an extension, and 
it is pointed out that very different sorts of experience would 
be regarded as confirmation of the assertion “Suppose we travel 
out along a straight line into Euclidean space and that at 10m. 
intervals we encounter an iron sphere, ad. Inf.” and the asser-
tion that we encounter 10,000 spheres in a row. [74, p.305] He 
then dismisses any comparison of the size of the sets of natu-
ral numbers and real numbers by means of cardinal numbers 
expresses this in [74，§172, p.208]. 
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as nonsense, because firstly, such sets may not be well-founded, 
and secondly, cardinal numbers are not genuine numbers, and 
thirdly, couiitably infinite and uncouiitably infinite sets are such 
different kinds of sets that it does not make sense to compare 
them. Such, in brief, was his argument against Cantor's cardi-
nalities in [74 . 
Is the Infinite a Rule or a Number? 
Cantor offers two accounts of numbers, namely the ordinal the-
ory of numbers and the cardinal theory of numbers.27 The or-
dinal theory of numbers is conceptually based on well-ordering 
while the cardinal theory of numbers is conceptually based on 
one-one correspondence. 
In a sense, ordinal numbers represent the procedure of count-
ing: sets are put into well-ordering and "quantitatively" repre-
sented in the mind via enumerals. For this reason, ordinal num-
bers can be said to be a philosophical compromise between a 
rule and a number, a kind of "static" counting. 
On the other hand, cardinal numbers represent a roundabout 
way of counting—counting through comparison by way of find-
ing a one-one function. 
Whichever one of the ways Cantor explicates numbers, the 
infinite is not taken as a rule. It is an extension and subject 
to Wittgenstein's criticism. The infinite as a rule is intuitively 
attractive, while the infinite as a immber gives unexpected and 
elegant results in Cantor's theory. While the fruit fulness of his 
theory makes it a convincing theory, its clash with ordinary un-
derstanding of quantity and comparison of size is a very serious 
problem. 
The implication of this would be clearer if we framed it in 
terms of computability, but we may refer our readers to the 
27This section offers a new perspective on the Cantor-Wittgenstein disagreement. 
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considerations in Section 4.1.2 to know the approach and con-
sequences without explicitly refraining and repeating this part. 
Let us now come to the last section, conceivability and com-
parability, which contains the last objection, tension with abso-
lute infinity, which is also aimed against Cantor's domain prin-
ciple, but via a different line of attack. 
4.3 Conceivability and Comparability 
Mathematics frequently touches on what is conceivable, what is 
comparable, and what is conceivably comparable; these have all 
much to do with the our conception of number and numerosity 
(which we have just discussed) because comparison in mathe-
matics is nearly always done by means of number and numeros-
ity, or some concepts closely related to them. Cantor's proofs 
push and mark the lines outlining what is conceivable, what is 
comparable, and what is conceivably comparable, all third. Infi-
nite sets were not really convincingly conceivable until they were 
shown to be comparable (via set-theoretical operations) and the 
result of comparison shown to be fruitful (as infinite sets were 
of different sizes). Cantor's conceptual "inventions" established 
the conceivability of such comparisons. However, Cantor main-
tains that there is a type of collection which is not comparable 
with others. Cantor calls such a collection absolute. 
Let us look at the problem it causes to Cantor's theory. 
4.3.1 Tension with Absolute Infinity 
Let us first review the domain principle, presented in Section 3.1. 
The domain principle states that, for any variable to be mean-
ingful in a mathematical context, there has to be a domain for 
it to range over. Its consequence is that any potential infinity 
presupposes a corresponding actual infinity. The domain prin-
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ciple justifies this presupposition in that it "forces" an equation 
with a variable x to have a domain of x. 
Cantor argues that natural and real number operations make 
existence of transfinite numbers inevitable because of the do-
main principle. And at the same time he maintains that the 
transfinite numbers themselves form a universe (but not a do-
main) of mathematical forms which constitute absolute infinity. 
But then why do the transfinite numbers not form a domain 
likewise, via the domain principle? And why do the transfinite 
numbers not require a domain for it to range over so as to be 
meaningful, as in the case of potential infinity? 
Cantor does not have a way of satisfactorily resolving this 
tension between the "numerability" (or the comparability) of 
transfinite numbers and the "unnumberability" (or the incompa-
rability, the absoluteness) of absolute infinity, other than invok-
ing God as the only one who can understand absolute infinity, 
and mentioning the undesirable consequence that this unique-
ness of God would be destroyed if absolute infinity were a do-
main and could be mathematically determined in the same way 
as transfinite numbers.^ ^ 
Justification for Type Distinction 
Cantor did not try to resolve this tension between the numer-
ability of transfinite numbers and the unnumberability of abso-
lute infinity, but maybe we could construe Cantor as implicitly 
assuming that there is a type distinction? 
We could construe Cantor as implicitly assuming that abso-
lute infinity cannot be conceived as a unity and thus nor can it 
be conceived as a set, simply because by definition there is an 
intrinsic type distinction between the increasable infinite (trans-
finite) and the absolute infinite in that the former can be a unity 
28No one questions this horrible weakness of Cantor's theory in the literature, and there 
are only brief textual references to this theistic argument of Cantor's in Hallett [34]. 
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while the latter cannot, but Cantor has not provided any justi-
fication for the difference between his treatments of transfinite 
numbers and absolute infinity. If there is a genuine type dis-
tinction, then non-theists do not need to stand aghast at the 
unconvincing invocation of God. Is there a justifiable type dis-
tinction between the increasable infinite (transfinite) and the 
absolute infinite? 
Cantor ordains in a rather ad hoc way that 
The ordinal numbers do not form a set, but an 
absolute collection. [34, p.168 
To be sure, Cantor could appeal to the Burali-Forti paradox^^ 
to justify his absolute infinity, since this paradox was already 
known to him. He could appeal to the Burali-Forti paradox 
in order to justify a type distinction between the increasable 
infinite (transfinite) and the absolute infinite because by the 
Burali-Forti paradox, if the order type of all ordinal numbers is 
an ordinal number and can be compared as ordinal numbers are 
compared, then paradox arises. Therefore if "absolute infinity" 
were also comparable with transfinite numbers, there would be 
a paradox, as it will be larger than itself. 
Indeed, in [13，p.114], Cantor tries to connect absolutely infi-
nite collections and inconsistent collections (see below) together 
as referring to the same things. But if they refer to the same 
things, it might recommend an axiomatic set theory rather than 
the postulation of absolute infinity. 
To gain insight into what Cantor calls inconsistent collections, 
let us look at his transfinite theory. Cantor [12] introduced his 
theory of transfinite numbers with something like this: 
29The Burali-Forti paradox is the paradox that if the order type of all ordinal numbers 
is an ordinal number, then it is strictly less than itself, because it is an ordinal number 
and the order type of all ordinal numbers is larger than any ordinal number, including 
itself, as it is an ordinal number. See Burali-Forti [10] for his original publication on this. 
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If n is any initial segment of numbers, then there 
is a least number S{Q) which is greater than all the 
numbers in d 
Examples of this operation of taking supremum, or least up-
per bound, are (cf. Section 1.2.5) 
5(empty segment) = 0 (4.6) 
5(0,... ,n) = n+1 (4.7) 
5 ( 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . ) =⑴ (4.8) 
Now if we were to take Q to be the initial segment of numbers 
and operate on it, then we may form 5(^7), and whenever we 
have a initial segment of numbers we seem to be able to take 
its supremum 5(0), and take it again, if we would like to. 
Now we have to concern ourselves with the totality of all num-
bers. Could we take its supremum? But here we have a problem, 
and the problem is that if we were to admit 5(all numbers) as a 
number, then we will have the absurd conclusion that it is less 
than itself: 
5'(all numbers) < 5(all numbers) 
as in the Burali-Forti paradox, because 5'(all numbers) is larger 
than any number, and as 5(all numbers) is also a number, it is 
larger than itself. 
The arguments above show that the problem of distinguish-
ing among those initial segments H of numbers to which upper 
bounds S{Q) can be assigned and those to which upper bounds 
S{fl) cannot be assigned is serious. If we cannot solve it we are 
going to end up with paradoxes. 
Cantor knew the existence of this problem and later, in an 
attempt to solve it, called the segments which have no upper 
bound inconsistent collections.加 These are now generally called 
30He did this in [13’ p.ll5]. 
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proper classes. On the other hand, segments which do have up-
per bounds are called sets or sometimes improper classes. How-
ever, picking them out by name does not by itself solve the 
problem. 
Condition on Taking Supremum 
A way to solve it that is mentioned in Tait [65, p.90] would 
be to make the definition of the numbers precise by setting up 
some precise condition $ on initial segments, and to admit its 
supremum 5(0) only when it satisfies the condition <E>, so that 
it would no longer be possible to obtain inconsistent collections. 
One can define the new operation thus, 
If O is any initial segment of numbers satisfying the 
condition (I), then there is a least number S{Q) which 
is greater than all the numbers in Q. 
Let us call this a <I)-number. It does not lead to contradiction 
in admitting 5(all numbers) because we can stipulate that 
the totality of all numbers, i.e. 5(all ^-numbers), does not 
satisfy the condition As it does not satisfy the condition 
5(all <[>-numbers) would not be a number and we could no 
longer derive the absurd conclusion that 
5(all $-numbers) < 5(all ^-numbers) 
as before. 
But we can add 5(all $-iminbers) as another number, pro-
vided that we do not keep using the condition (I) and that we 
switch a new condition, say 屯，and have it as a ^-number. And 
then, when we want to take the supremum of all ^-numbers, we 
may add yet another number satisfying another condition, and 
continue this process indefinitely. Formulated in this inanrier, 
the theory of transfinite numbers would never be complete. 
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One either makes use of conditions like (I) or not, and if one 
makes use of them, the theory would be open-ended, while if 
one does not make use of therri, one is left with absolute infinity 
as Cantor was.^ ^ Both seem to be very unsatisfactory, and this 
pair of alternative constitutes an important objection to Can-
tor's transfinite theory, for this is entailed by his comparable 
infinities. 
The reason that this is entailed by his comparable infinities 
is that if infinity were from the outset not allowed of those op-
erations Cantor formulated, there would not be the problem of 
open-endedness because of the conceptual characteristic of ordi-
nals, and there would not be the problem of absolute infinity in 
a bid to put an end to the unending series of infinite ordinals. 
The problem of open-endedness causes unstability to the the-
ory while its alternative, the problem of absolute infinity, causes 
inconsistency—not due to inconsistent collection per se, but due 
to the inconsisteny of standard. This inconsisteny of standard 
poses a very serious threat to the theory. 
4.4 Conclusion 
We have brought to clear view the philosophically suspect as-
sumptions of his theory (the three principles in Chapter 3) and 
critically examined these assumptions and presented reformu-
lated arguments against them (the six problems in Chapter 4). 
We have given a well-articulated account of the whole issue 
which has not been brought together before and which enables 
the reader to decide his stance in the matter. 
In this chapter, after having given all the relevant back-
grounds and explanations in the previous ones, we discussed var-
ious problems of Cantor's transfinite theory, and those are: the 
311 have not seen this dilemma noted or used as an objection against Cantor in the 
literature. 
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endorsement of free mathematics, the use of non-constructive 
proof, the need to justify his weak reductionism, the existence 
of non-Cantorian sets, intension in an extensional theory, and, 
finally, tension of increasable infinity with absolute infinity. 
First of all we discussed Cantor's endorsement of free math-
ematics which is the doctrine that endorses a maximum ontol-
ogy, allowing existence whenever no inconsistencies result. We 
argued that free mathematics gives rise to more difficult foun-
dational questions. The lack of existence proofs and violating 
the simplicity principle were also defects in his theory. 
After that we discussed the use of non-constructive proof in 
Cantor's theory. A constructive proof is a proof in which the 
existence of a mathematical object or function etc. is not simply 
proved by establishing that its non-existence is contradictory, 
but instead proved by showing that algorithmic construction of 
that object from some accepted primitives is possible in prin-
ciple. We went into the myriad of arguments between classical 
mathematicians and intuitionist constructivists, and presented 
the philosophical considerations against non-constructive proofs. 
And then we discussed Cantor's weak reductionism. It is 
weak in that he does not simply reduce numbers to sets, but 
it is reductionistic in that numbers and their existence are ex-
plained and justified in terms of sets. We showed that his weak 
reductionism is unwarranted. 
We went on to discuss the problem posed by non-Cantorian 
sets for Cantor's transfinite theory. Non-Cantorian sets were a 
problem for Cantor's transfinite theory because any theory that 
admits non-Cantorian sets endorses a fundamentally different 
ontology from Cantorian set theory and renders powerless the 
abstraction principle which accounts for numbers by means of 
cardinal numbers and which accounts for the comparison and 
manipulations of cardinal numbers by means of one-one corre-
spondence. 
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The next problem that we discussed was use of intension in 
Cantor's theory which is inevitably extensional. By definition, 
the extension of an infinite concept cannot be completely listed 
and, more specifically, the objects in an infinite class cannot 
be completely listed. Therefore one has to use intensional def-
initions. The use of intensional definitions means that it is no 
longer truly an extensional theory, causing inconsistency. 
Lastly we discussed the tension of increasable infinity with 
absolute infinity. This tension has to do with the dubious role 
of absolute infinity and its clash with the domain principle. Can-
tor does not have a way of satisfactorily resolving this tension 
between the numerability of transfinite numbers and the unnum-
berability of absolute infinity, and of explaining his difference in 
treatments of transfinite numbers and absolute infinity. 
Considering the above arguments, beautiful as Cantor's par-
adise is, we may probably have to renounce it, if we are to act 
sensibly. 
There are numerous problems with Cantor's theory, even 
though the controversy is not overwhelmingly against Cantor, 
as both sides of the argument have their points to offer. Co-
hen and Hersh [18] think that the development of set theory 
and that of geometry are analogous, and they hint that as non-
Euclidean geometry found interpretation in the works of physics 
of Minkowsky and Einstein, non-Cantorian set theory might one 
day find its use outside mathematics and facilitate wider recep-
tion. (Of course Cantor is not as towering a figure as Euclid is, 
but his theory is nevertheless very commonly accepted.) Indeed 
quantum mechanics promises support for finitary mathematics. 
But the problem of application will have to be covered by an-
other paper, for we had only the space to cover the problem on 
the theoretical level. 
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